HOLLOW COMMITMENTS 2023

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AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' CLIMATE FINANCE PLANS

This report was written by Andrew Hattle and Christopher Roy (INKA Consult), with contributions from John Nordbo (CARE).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2009, developed countries committed to contribute USD 100 billion of climate finance annually to developing countries from 2020 onwards, with the finance to be balanced between support for climate change adaptation and mitigation.

Developed countries have updated their plans outlining the climate finance they aim to provide in coming years. But despite some progress in wealthy countries' reporting of these future efforts, they are still unable to provide evidence that they will actually deliver on their collective commitment to provide USD 100 billion in annual support.

Furthermore, only six wealthy countries have presented serious plans for redressing the imbalance in climate finance, which continues to be heavily skewed towards support for mitigation.

And only three countries have stated that they will treat their climate finance contributions as supplementary to their existing UN commitment to provide 0.7% of gross national income as official development assistance. This means that, undertakings to provide more climate finance may in reality represent deductions from support for other development objectives.

It is clear that developing countries and those that are particularly vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change will not obtain the support to which they are entitled unless the wealthy countries change course.

Under the Paris Agreement, every other year, developed countries are obliged to submit information to the UNFCCC in the form of biennial communications describing their future plans for providing climate finance to developing countries. The first submissions were due by the end of 2020, and CARE analysed these in the report "Hollow Commitments" (CARE, 2021b).

The second set of plans were due at the end of 2022, and almost all wealthy countries have now made their submissions. This report reviews these plans.

When comparing wealthy countries' most recent plans to those submitted in 2020, we find that significant progress has been made. We have scored each biennial communication against five criteria based on the key UNFCCC commitments (see Annex A); each country can obtain a maximum of 20 points.

More than half of the countries which submitted plans have improved them. In some cases, such as the submissions from Canada and Denmark, the improvements were significant. In many cases, however, any improvements started from a low benchmark. In general, wealthy countries are still failing to significantly improve the predictability of their future support.

Table 1 summarises the scores and rankings assigned to each country's plan. Luxembourg has now been joined by New Zealand in joint first place on our list.

Second biennial communication (due end of 2022)			First biennial communication (due end of 2020)	
Rank	Party (country)	Score (0-20)	Score (0-20)	Change
1	Luxembourg	12	11	+1
-	New Zealand	12	8	+4
2	Finland	11	7	+4
3	United Kingdom	10	7	+3
4	Ireland	9	7	+2
-	Denmark	9	3	+6
-	Sweden	9	9	-
5	Canada	8	2	+6
-	Belgium	8	4	+4
6	Australia	7	6	+1
-	Germany	7	4	+3
-	Netherlands	7	4	+3
-	Norway	7	4	+3
7	European Commission	6	6	-
-	United States*	6	-	-
-	France	6	3	+3
-	Switzerland	6	5	+1
8	Italy	4	3	+1
9	Austria	3	0	+3
10	Spain	2	2	-
-	Japan	2	0	+2
-	Portugal	2	2	-
11	Czech Republic	1	0	+1
-	Slovenia**	1	-	-
12	Greece	0	0	-
-	Slovakia	0	0	-

Table 1: *Scores and rankings of second biennial communications submitted in accordance with Article 9.5. of the Paris Agreement, comparing scores to first biennial communication submissions (CARE, 2021b). Information provided by each country on future climate finance has been assessed against five criteria, and for each criterion the clarity and compliance of each country's ex-ante climate finance reporting has been scored. Countries are ranked by their total score across the five criteria.*

** The United States did not submit their first biennial communication prior to publication of CARE's 2021 analysis.*

*** Slovenia was not included in CARE's 2021 analysis.*

Key Takeaways

While progress can be seen when comparing first and second biennial communication submissions, five key takeaways can be drawn from the submissions regarding the clarity of the information provided and the degree to which it enhances the predictability of future support for developing countries.

1. NO ASSURANCE THAT ANNUAL USD 100 BILLION GOAL WILL BE MET

Most of the progress apparent in the second biennial communications is in response to Criterion 1, which focuses on the details of future levels of support to be provided by each country.

Two years ago, most countries provided almost no quantitative information to define the levels of support they planned to provide, although this was the main purpose of the submissions.

Now the situation is quite different. Most wealthy countries have provided some form of quantitative projection for their climate finance contributions to developing countries, and many of them have pledged to increase these contributions.

However, some issues issues remain:

(a) Some countries have still failed to provide detailed quantitative information on their future plans for support, namely Austria, Greece, Iceland and Italy. While the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have also failed to provide this information, these countries are not under the same obligation to provide climate finance as other wealthy countries.

(b) It is not possible to directly compare the various countries' pledges on the basis of quantitative information or targets. Some pledges commit to providing an amount of finance over a number of years, while others specify a target to be met by a certain year. Some pledges include a broad range of public and mobilised private climate finance, while others include only public finance with varying degrees of climate focus. Furthermore, some pledges include an estimate of the climate finance resulting from a country's core contributions to multilateral development banks (MDBs), whereas others only include finance explicitly earmarked for climate objectives.

(c) When combined, wealthy countries' pledges add up to approximately USD 57 billion a year – a little more than half of their collective commitment. This implies that these countries are expecting other contributors, such as MDBs and the private sector, to deliver the remainder of the agreed USD 100 billion. While these secondary contributors do play a significant role in delivering climate finance – in the case of MDBs, a role that has steadily grown over the last decade – the responsibility for ensuring that the promised climate finance is actually delivered rests with the developed countries.

(d) Almost all the financial pledges included in the plans were announced in 2021, but not all countries are on track to deliver their promised support. For example, the United States has pledged to deliver USD 11.4 billion of climate finance annually by 2024, yet has only approved USD 2 billion in 2023 to date, including USD 1 billion of appropriated climate finance and a USD 1 billion pledge to the Green Climate Fund (Thwaites, Schmidt, and Guy, 2022; The White House, 2023).[1] Another major contributor, Germany, has pledged EUR 6 billion annually from budgetary sources by 2025 – yet budget prognoses for 2022 and 2023 stand at just EUR 4.3 billion (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022). If the United States and Germany fail to achieve their annual targets by such margins, this failure alone will amount to a climate finance underspend of approximately USD 11 billion – a shortfall that would significantly reduce the likelihood of attaining the USD 100 billion goal.

The Climate Finance Delivery plan published by wealthy countries in 2021 specifies that at least USD 82.5 billion of the USD 100 billion goal should be provided as public climate finance in 2023 (COP26 Presidency, 2021; OECD, 2021). The Delivery Plan does not specify how much of this amount is to be provided by each contributor, and it was drawn up on the basis of questionnaires submitted to the OECD which are not publicly available. Developed countries' second biennial communications therefore offered an opportunity to present a clear pathway towards achieving their goal. But wealthy countries have missed this opportunity to present a detailed, robust

1 The US has the potential to provide further climate finance through other channels, but this finance is not reported ex-ante.

pathway towards fulfilling their collective pledge, and to meaningfully ensure the predictability of their future support.

To date, developed countries have failed to live up to their collective promise in a timely manner. This analysis highlights two factors contributing to this collective failure – factors which also reduce the predictability of climate finance for developing countries. The first is an unwillingness to tackle the issue of effort sharing or "fair shares", i.e. to distribute responsibility for the USD 100 billion pledge clearly and equitably. The second concerns the failure of wealthy countries to consistently define substantiated, attainable pathways towards achieving their targets. Without robust plans to deliver them, the last decade has shown that commitments can be broken and targets missed.

BOX 1 · OVER-REPORTING IS WIDESPREAD

The financial pledges included in wealthy countries' second biennial communications assume that they will continue to report their own climate finance totals using their own accounting practices.

Numerous studies have shown that wealthy countries significantly over-report the climate finance they provide. In a study of more than 100 adaptation projects, CARE found that developed countries and multilateral development banks (MDBs) routinely exaggerate their climate finance contributions. We found that figures are over-reported by an average of around 40% (CARE, 2021a). In an audit conducted by Oxfam, 40% of the climate finance reported by the World Bank in 2020 could not be independently verified (Oxfam, 2022).

In another study, Oxfam concludes that a large proportion of the reported climate finance contributions takes the form of loans, often provided on non-concessional terms. Based on this, Oxfam estimates that the actual value of climate finance may well amount to just one third of what the wealthy countries themselves report (Carty and Kowalzig, 2022).

Once the issue of over-reporting and its impact on actual levels of support provided to developing countries is acknowledged, meeting climate finance goals will require a transformational increase in climate finance contributions moving forward.

2. ADAPTATION GETS MORE ATTENTION, BUT BALANCED SUPPORT REMAINS OUT OF SIGHT

Climate finance is supposed to be balanced between support for mitigation and support for adaptation. However, finance has consistently been skewed towards mitigation. In Criterion 2, we assess whether wealthy countries recognise this imbalance, and if so, how they aim to fix it.

Our analysis indicates that more developed countries are recognising that adaptation objectives are severely underfinanced, and consequently intend to target adaptation over mitigation in the coming years. Two years ago, only Ireland and New Zealand stated that they would focus on adaptation to redress the global imbalance. Now Australia, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands have followed suit. These six countries also have a track record of providing more than or close to 50% of their public climate finance towards adaptation objectives.

Despite there being more recognition of the need to increase adaptation finance in second biennial communications, only ten submissions have presented quantitative adaptation finance targets in their submissions (Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission). When combined, these pledges add up to approximately USD 14.3 billion of adaptation finance annually. Only the targets from Denmark, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the European Commission attempt to ensure that at least 50% of total future public support will go towards adaptation. Even when assuming that the countries without concrete adaptation finance targets will contribute the same proportion of their future climate finance towards adaptation as they did in the past, the total rises to just USD 18.1 billion.

Most wealthy countries, including the four biggest contributors (Japan, France, Germany and the United States), provide information suggesting that less than half of their total climate finance will target adaptation. This means that there is essentially still no chance of achieving balanced, international support for mitigation and adaptation objectives in the near future.

Many submissions do include qualitative commitments to work towards collectively doubling adaptation finance by 2025, as agreed at COP26. However, a lack of detail regarding the quantitative levels of support to be provided for adaptation in coming years means that no pathway has yet been defined for fulfilling this commitment.

3. LACK OF CLARITY PERSISTS REGARDING SUPPORT FOR MOST VULNERABLE

The Paris Agreement prioritises support for the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). Criterion 3 assesses the extent to which the biennial communications submitted explain how wealthy countries intend to address the needs of the most vulnerable. The analysis shows that in some areas, a degree of progress has been made.

Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom provide qualitative statements indicating that they will make a concerted effort to preferentially support such countries – and have a track record of doing so. However, only Ireland, Luxembourg and New Zealand provide detailed quantitative information on the levels of support they aim to provide for these most vulnerable countries in the future.

Women and girls are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change than men and boys. Developed countries are asked to provide indicative information on the gender responsiveness of their future support. However, only three countries (Australia, Austria and Sweden) provide quantitative evidence of previous levels of gender responsiveness in their climate/development support, while just four countries (France, Germany, New Zealand and the United States) present targets for gender-responsive climate/development finance or state their intention to increase the levels of gender-responsive finance.

Substantive detail relating to gender is routinely lacking in submissions. Biennial communications commonly dedicate one or two sentences to the issue of mainstreaming gender in development policy, or to gender equality as a cross-cutting objective, even though half of all developed countries' climate-related development finance fails to include gender-equality objectives (see Box 6).

BOX 2 · MINIMAL INFORMATION ON FINANCE FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE

At COP27 in 2022, after years of slow-moving negotiations, developed-country Parties agreed to provide funding to vulnerable countries for loss and damage incurred. While rich countries have not been formally asked to provide information in their biennial communications (BCs) on their planned future efforts to avert, minimise and address losses and damages, for vulnerable countries the issue is of the utmost and immediate importance. Of the 26 BCs assessed here, nine took the opportunity to provide qualitative information on past or present efforts to support action on loss and damage (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the European Commission). In general, information to outline volumes of future financial support is lacking, and the predictability of financial assistance to tackle climate-induced losses and damages has not been enhanced through the submissions.

4. LACK OF AMBITION AND SOLIDARITY MEANS ONGOING LACK OF "NEW MONEY" FOR CLIMATE ACTION

In Criterion 4, we analyse how countries intend to ensure that their climate finance is "new and additional" to their support for development (i.e. ODA). The provision of new and additional finance is crucial for developing countries. Diverting funds for tackling poverty towards support for climate activities would be unjust, attributing the responsibility for action to the poorest people in the world who have played no role in creating the climate emergency. To protect against this, developed countries should meet their UN commitment to provide 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) as ODA, while providing their climate finance on top of this support.

Nevertheless, only three countries – Sweden, Norway and Luxembourg – verify that they will make their climate finance contributions in addition to the 0.7% UN target. The situation was the same two years ago.

In general, definitions of "new and additional" climate finance remain inadequate. CARE has shown that just 45% of the climate finance provided by developed countries exceeds the level of development finance provided back in 2009, when the USD 100 billion goal was first agreed, while just 6% of the finance provided exceeds the ODA target of 0.7% of GNI (CARE, 2022).

Since 2009, development finance has been increasing more slowly than climate finance, meaning large amounts of climate finance have been provided by reorienting development support towards climate objectives. While climate change should be an important consideration in all development activities, neither development nor climate finance totals have increased sufficiently over the last decade.

5. MOBILISING PRIVATE-SECTOR SUPPORT IMPORTANT FOR MOST RICH COUNTRIES

In Criterion 5, CARE assesses the extent to which countries provide clear, detailed information on their plans to mobilise private-sector resources.

Countries such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Commission, provide a certain amount of information on their plans to mobilise private climate finance in the future, discussing some of the financial instruments and channels which will be used to engage with the private sector.

However, the amount of detail on wealthy countries' intentions to mobilise private-sector resources varies widely. While certain countries with state-owned development finance institutions do present climate-related investment targets (e.g. Finnfund in Finland; British International Investments in the United Kingdom), other countries only provide qualitative plans.

Mobilised private finance is often counted towards the USD 100 billion goal as if it were comparable to public support. But compared to public support, the various submissions provide much less detail and transparency regarding the levels of support to be mobilised or the forms such private support will take.

More generally, significant concerns remain with respect to the types of activities that will be funded through private climate finance, as well as the burdensome conditions often attached to private loans (Woolfenden and Sharma Khushal, 2022). Due to their profit-seeking nature, private funds flow towards activities which are most likely to provide a return on an investment. Consequently, private climate finance rarely supports adaptation or flows to countries where funds are most needed (Chowdhury and Sundaram, 2022).

Recommendations:

1. All wealthy countries should take responsibility for the absence of a clear pathway towards delivery of their collective pledge to provide USD 100 billion per year in support for mitigation and adaptation. They should carefully analyse what they can do themselves, and what they expect of their peers. It is imperative that wealthy countries fully live up to their commitment to provide a total of USD 600 billion in climate finance over the 2020-2025 period.

2. Similarly, wealthy countries should produce a roadmap detailing how they will deliver on their COP26 undertaking to double adaptation finance by 2025, as a step towards achieving balance between mitigation and adaptation finance thereafter.

3. All wealthy countries should redouble their efforts to plan their future climate support in such a way as to provide predictability and ensure that the most vulnerable countries and people are prioritised. Climate finance should be pro-poor and gender-transformative.

4. To show good faith in the negotiations over future climate finance, at COP28, all wealthy countries should declare that starting in 2024, their climate finance contributions will be provided on top of the levels of non-climate-related official development assistance which they are currently providing.

5. In the negotiations over future climate finance to be concluded at COP29 in 2024, countries should agree on a clear effort sharing among wealthy countries, i.e. exactly how much climate finance each country should provide as a minimum. A set of clear definitions of climate finance and reporting requirements should also be drawn up, so that it is possible to track delivery on commitments and check overall levels of planned climate finance to be provided over specific periods of time.

6. When submitting the next editions of their biennial communications on future climate finance contributions at the end of 2024, developed countries should ensure that they provide all the information requested, as agreed at COP24. They should also report much more comprehensively on how they will respond to the UNFCCC gender action plan and advance integration of gender considerations in their climate finance. They should set a goal of marking at least 85% of projects with at least OECD gender marker 1.

As the next biennial communications will project for the time beyond 2025, implications of the agreement on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance to be achieved by COP29 in late 2024 will have to be taken into account. From CARE's perspective this means that wealthy countries should provide plans for support for loss and damage. This new category of climate finance should be strictly separate from adaptation support with no double-counting.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the developed-country Parties to the UNFCCC committed to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion annually from 2020, with the aim of addressing the climate change needs of developing-country Parties. There are reasonable expectations that this annual sum could increase after 2025 as negotiations on a new financial target (the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), initiated at COP26 in Glasgow, should be finalised in 2024.

Under the UNFCCC, one of the key official tools for tracking the progress of developed countries in providing this funding are the "biennial reports" (BRs) submitted by each country. These reports represent ex-post accounts of the climate finance contributed by the respective Parties in the past.

In parallel, however, Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement also recognised the importance of transparency in describing each country's plans for future contributions. Decision 12/CMA.1, made at COP24, required each developed-country Party to submit 15 "types of information" on the projected quantitative and qualitative support the country plans to provide to developing countries in the future.[1]

The overarching aim of these "biennial communications" is to increase the clarity, predictability, and efficiency of support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC provides access to this ex-ante climate finance reporting via a dedicated online portal, and the Secretariat is to compile the submissions into a synthesis report for informing the Global Stocktake (GST).[2]

Developed-country Parties agreed to submit their first biennial communication by the end of 2020, with subsequent submissions to be made every two years thereafter, to regularly provide enhanced information detailing their projected climate finance for the coming years. The submissions are intended to add detail to discussions of climate finance in the run-up to the following year's COP negotiations. The

1 *The Annex to this report includes the full text of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, as well as decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.*

2 *Ex-ante Climate Finance information post-2020: https://unfccc.int/Art.9.5-biennial-communications*

deadline for submitting the second round of biennial communications was the end of 2022, so they can be used in discussions at COP28 in November and December of 2023.

Reflecting the political importance of ex-ante climate finance reporting, it is also important to acknowledge that developed countries have consistently pushed back on developing countries' demands that climate finance plans should also be reported in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Due to the urgent need to rapidly scale up the provision of financial support for climate action in parallel with ongoing negotiations surrounding long-term climate finance, it is important that the content and compliance of biennial communications are routinely assessed in the context of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

In 2021, CARE published its analysis of developed-country Parties' first biennial communications submissions (CARE, 2021b). The report found that developed countries were not on track to deliver the annual USD 100 billion in climate finance promised in support of climate action in developing countries. Developed countries failed to clearly describe how they would provide scaled-up, predictable and reliable financial support to the developing countries most at risk. The report also found that adaptation efforts in developing countries would remain severely underfunded, not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of the total climate finance to be provided.

Notwithstanding the over-reporting within developed countries self-reported climate finance figures, since CARE's first report, the ex-post reports submitted by the wealthy countries themselves have confirmed that they failed to reach their collective goal in 2020, and that they broke the commitment made in 2009 (Oxfam, 2020; OECD, 2022). As CARE has also shown, the climate finance provided by rich countries lacks additionality, and continues to hinder stronger climate action in developing countries (CARE, 2022). Without immediate and significant increases in both development finance and new and additional climate finance, progress towards key sustainable development goals will continue to be insufficient.

In 2021, as a response to this collective failure to deliver sufficiently scaled-up climate finance, developed countries published their Climate Finance Delivery Plan, building on new financial pledges made surrounding COP26 (COP26 Presidency, 2021; OECD, 2021). The Plan, as well as the subsequent Progress Report, presented a pathway for reaching the USD 100 billion annual goal, stating with confidence that developed countries would fulfil their collective pledge by 2023 (ibid.; Government of Canada, 2022).

Consequently, the objective of this report is to assess and rank the second round of of biennial communications submitted to the UNFCCC. Our analysis seeks to determine whether the submissions live up to the content and spirit of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement and other relevant commitments under the Convention, and to establish whether developed countries are providing sufficient information to confirm that they will come good on their collective promise.

With this report, CARE aims to further enhance transparency by facilitating an increased understanding of developed countries' varying levels of performance and ambition, while making the case for new, more ambitious financial pledges for the period following 2025. Vulnerable developing countries are already suffering from the impacts of the climate crisis. Their governments have a responsibility to build frameworks for improving their citizens' resilience to the impacts of climate change; because climate change has been caused primarily by the Global North, countries in the Global South are entitled to financial support for these efforts.

Two of CARE's core demands are first, that financial support should be based on the obligations of developed countries as enshrined in the Convention and Paris Agreement, ensuring that at least 50% of climate finance is allocated to adaptation, and second, that gender equality and women's empowerment are an integral part of these climate finance obligations. As many of the impacts of climate change will continue to exceed peoples' ability to adapt due to the inadequacy of current and projected emission-reducing measures, CARE also sees the need for additional resources to address the growing loss and damage faced by developing countries.

Requests for Annex II Parties to provide ex-ante information on development finance are not new. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action both recognised that developed countries were failing to provide predictable aid flows, hence required these countries to provide "reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework" (OECD, 2005; 2008). In 2011, an OECD-commissioned review of the information provided by developed countries, and of the actions they had taken, found that progress towards ensuring predictability had been slow (Woods et al., 2011). Since 2011, the Declaration's monitoring mechanism has not been maintained by wealthy-country contributors. So now it is important to determine whether the most recently submitted biennial communications show a desire to address these shortcomings.

In presenting the results of this analysis, Section 1 provides a summary of the clarity and compliance of the information provided in all 2 of the in the Global South submissions assessed, while Section 2 presents and breaks down the key information included in each developed country's submission.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

In this report, the second round of biennial communications have been assessed against five criteria designed to explore their adherence to existing UNFCCC commitments, as well as the relative quality and detail of the submissions. In turn, the criteria are based on the 15 "types of information" (a-o) outlined in the Annex to decision 12.CMA.1 concerning Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement (as presented in Annex A to this report). As outlined in the assessment criteria below, the "types of information" relevant to each criterion are listed after their respective definitions. The criteria are specifically designed to explore the details of projected levels of future climate finance. Details of past climate finance contributions are already available from various other sources, including the biennial reports.

"Future level of support": The Paris Agreement reiterated the commitments of developed-country Parties to provide and mobilise an annual total of USD 100 billion in climate finance by providing scaled-up financial resources to developing-country Parties, and to clearly report their ex-post contributions biennially. Furthermore, Article 9.5 of the Agreement states that developed countries shall communicate details of the projected levels of public finance they are planning to provide to developing-country Parties; again, biennially. **The first assessment criterion, "future level of support"**, assesses whether Annex II Parties are complying with these commitments to provide enhanced, ex-ante information on future climate finance provisions with sufficient clarity to ensure that their support for developing countries is predictable.

"Balance between adaptation and mitigation support": Current OECD estimates suggest that developed countries provided and mobilised just USD 28.4 billion of adaptation finance in 2020, and that just 24% of the international climate finance contributed in 2016-2020 covered adaptation (OECD, 2022). Furthermore, while decision 12.CMA.1 recognises that developed countries should prioritise public, grant-based support for adaptation, the use of loans to deliver adaptation finance increased over the same period (ibid.). **The second assessment criterion, "balance between adaptation and mitigation support"**, acknowledges this historic imbalance and addresses the commitment in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement – that "the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation".

"The most vulnerable": Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement specifies that in addition to being balanced, any climate finance provisions must also consider "country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable". **The third criterion, "the most vulnerable"**, acknowledges Articles 7.5 and 7.6 of the Agreement, and aims to assess the extent to which developing country ownership of interventions, vulnerability and gender responsiveness has been considered in the indicative information provided.

"Additionality": For developing-country Parties, many of the costs of climate change are additional to the costs of development. Consequently, commitments made in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreement stipulated that climate finance should be scaled-up, new and additional, while Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement requires climate finance contributions to represent a progression beyond previous efforts. For developing-country Parties, clear and meaningful definitions of additionality can help to demonstrate that increases in climate finance will not displace ODA provisions, improving the predictability of both. The fourth criterion, "additionality", assesses how developed-country Parties have defined additionality, and whether the definition is adequate.

"Mobilisation of further resources": Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement states that developed-country Parties should "continue to take the lead in mobilising climate finance from a wide variety of sources", and that their actions should represent a progression beyond previous efforts. In addition, Article 2.1.c states that all financial flows must be "consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse-gas emissions and climate-resilient development". **The final criterion, "mobilisation of further resources"**, addresses the mobilisation of further financial resources, in particular from private sources.

BOX 3 · "FAIR SHARES" OF CLIMATE FINANCE

Developed countries are responsible for the majority of historic cumulative greenhouse gas emissions while developing countries will be most adversely impacted by climate change. The commitment made by developed countries in 2009, to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion of climate finance a year by 2020, recognises this injustice and underpins the "grand bargain" of the Paris Agreement: that developing countries would undertake ambitious action on climate change, but would require support from developed countries to enable them to do so. While acknowledging that the historic responsibility for climate change lies with countries in the Global North, the joint commitment relies on pledging and does not apportion the responsibility to provide a certain amount of finance to certain developed countries. The resulting ambiguity surrounding who contributes how much, has, in part, prevented the creation of a clear roadmap towards fulfilling the USD 100 billion commitment over the last decade.

Using metrics such as Gross National Income (GNI) and cumulative greenhouse gas emissions (among others) various studies have attempted to determine whether individual developed countries have been contributing their "fair share" of the joint commitment (Colenbrander et al., 2021; Egli and Stünzi, 2019; Kowalzig, 2019; Waslander and Quijano Vallejos, 2018; Bos and Thwaites, 2021). Yet because contributors of climate finance can report different forms of finance, such as grants and loans, as equivalent, it is often difficult to compare the relative efforts of different countries.

Developed countries are not requested to provide information to indicate how, or whether, they will contribute their fair share of the USD 100 billion commitment in their biennial communications. Despite this, this report recognises the importance of effort sharing for ensuring the predictability of climate finance in the future. As a result, CARE assesses whether a country's biennial communication engages with the issue of "fair shares" in its submission.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

1. **Future level of support**: Does the Party provide enhanced information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on projects, programmes, and recipient countries? (a, b, c)

   → *Does the Party provide indicative, quantitative information on projected future climate finance figures across multiple years?*

   → *Does the Party provide annual or periodic totals, thereby ensuring that the Party will provide its fair share of significantly scaled-up finances in contributing to the USD 100 billion goal?*

   → *Does the Party provide comprehensive information that clearly shows how these projected finances will be apportioned? And includes details of recipient countries, projects and programmes?*

2. **Balance between adaptation and mitigation support**: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and support for mitigation in this future finance? (d, j)

   → *Does the Party recognise that there is a significant imbalance between adaptation and mitigation support in present global climate finance provisions, and that more adaptation finance must be provided to redress this global imbalance?*

   → *Does the Party provide information on balanced provisions with explicit reference to projected future climate finance, and not just to previous climate finance provisions?*

   → *Does the Party provide information reflecting an appropriate response to the need for public grant-based support for adaptation purposes?*

3. **The most vulnerable**: Does the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and provide clarity on development participants and the scope of gender responsiveness in future climate finance provisions? (c, j, l)

   → *Does the Party provide substantive information showing how country-driven strategies will be financed?*

   → *Does the Party clearly explain how their future climate finance provisions will target the most vulnerable, including information on finance for LDCs and SIDS?*

   → *Does the Party provide detailed information on how they will ensure gender responsiveness in their future climate finance contributions?*

4. **Additionality:** Does the Party ensure the additionality of their climate finance? (f, n)

   → *Does the Party apply a definition of additionality which is in line with both the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC?*

   → *Does the Party provide safeguards to ensure that their future provisions of climate finance will not displace official development assistance (ODA)?*

5. **Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party provided clear plans for mobilising further resources, and for helping to make finance flows consistent with low greenhouse-gas emissions and climate-resilient development? (k, m)

   → *Does the Party provide clear and substantive information on plans to mobilise additional resources – such as private-sector resources – and include indicative, qualitative and quantitative detail?*

   → *Does the Party provide information showing how its future provisions of climate finance will adhere to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including details of how this support will make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse-gas emissions and climate-resilient development?*

ASSESSMENT PARAMETERS

For each criterion, submissions were scored against two parameters, A and B, as outlined below. Table 2 shows the total scores for each Party, plus overall average scores for each criterion and parameter.

A.	Clarity of information
0	The submission does not provide clear information addressing the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.
1	The submission provides clear information addressing the majority of the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.
2	The submission provides clear information addressing all the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.

B.	Compliance with commitments
0	The information submitted does not evidence compliance with the content or spirit of commitments relating to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.
1	The information submitted evidences partial compliance with the content and spirit of commitments relating to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.
2	The information submitted fully complies with the content and spirit of commitments relating to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.

SECTION 1

CLARITY AND COMPLIANCE OF BIENNIAL COMMUNICATION SUBMISSIONS

By the end of March 2023, 34 second-round biennial communications had been submitted to the UNFCCC. Of these, 11 were provided by non-Annex II Parties; that is, developed-country Parties who are not formally obliged to provide support to developing-country Parties, as outlined in Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the Convention.[1] Despite this, three non-Annex II Parties – the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia – affirmed a strong commitment to the goal of jointly mobilising USD 100 billion in annual funding, and have been included in the assessments.

This report therefore presents an analysis of 26 submissions, including submissions from the 22 Annex II Parties with obligations to provide climate-related support to developing countries, as well as from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, and from the European Commission.

In addition to the second biennial communication submitted by the European Union (EU), containing the submissions from individual Member States, Annex II submissions were received from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, Iceland had not submitted their second biennial communication, despite an obligation to do so. Iceland has therefore not fulfilled their commitment to provide indicative quantitative and qualitative information on the projected levels of public climate finance they intend to provide to developing-country Parties.

It is important to acknowledge that the EU's joint submission contains a shared chapter, as well as the latest biennial communications from individual Member States and the European Commission. This shared chapter provides aggregate trends and figures describing the EU and its Member States' climate and adaptation finance contributions over the last decade, alongside qualitative information on the mobilisation of private finance. The shared chapter also provides information on EU-wide efforts to support capacity building and technology transfer, as well as shared policy positions with respect to, for example, Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement. This report focuses on the extent to which second-round biennial communications

1 Non-Annex II Parties that submitted biennial communications: Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Monaco.

enhance the predictability of future climate finance for developing countries. Consequently, the clarity and compliance of the information on indicative financial flows provided by the individual Parties are of primary interest. While useful for providing context, the analysis did not find that the common elements in the EU's biennial communication contribute to the scores of individual Member States.

In the years between the first and second biennial communications, 2021-2022, developed countries came under increasing pressure to show how and when they would meet the USD 100 billion annual target. As a result, the second biennial communications reflect many of the new and updated climate finance targets which were communicated around COP26 in 2021. Although the detail and ambition associated with these targets vary considerably, of the 26 submissions assessed, 19 presented quantitative targets for future climate support.

Parties such as Germany, Japan and Spain, who are responsible for large volumes of climate finance but failed to provide substantive details of their plans for future climate finance in their first biennial communications, have now outlined quantitative targets for their future support. Other Parties whose first biennial communications failed to provide financial projections, or showed only that their finance would remain constant in the coming years, have also included scaled-up targets. They include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the European Commission.

Among the larger providers, only Italy and Austria did not specify a financial target in their second biennial communications.[2] Smaller providers such as Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia also failed to provide targets for their future climate finance provisions.

Although the quality, clarity, and completeness of ex-ante climate finance reporting in the second round of biennial communications have improved in some areas, albeit to varying degrees, submissions are still far from providing meaningful predictability for developing-country partners. No Party has come close to fully complying with the five assessment criteria applied in this analysis. The highest-rated submissions remain far from providing a holistic picture of those contributors' annual future climate finance provisions.

The information submitted continues to fall short of providing the predictability and enhanced information requested in Article 9.5. Second biennial communications fail to describe, in detail, the finances to be provided collectively by donors in the coming years, or, in some cases, to confirm that they will be significantly scaled up.

It is not possible to directly compare the various countries' pledges on the basis of quantitative information or targets. Some pledges commit to providing an amount of finance over a number of years, while others specify a target to be met by a certain year. Some pledges include a broad range of public and mobilised private climate finance, while others include only public finance with varying degrees of climate focus. Furthermore, some pledges include an estimate of the climate finance resulting from a country's core contributions to multilateral development banks, whereas others only include finance explicitly earmarked for climate objectives.

One can nevertheless make a rough estimation of the overall level of future climate finance covered by the biennial communications. This can be done by summing targeted amount for countries with single year targets, assuming equal distribution across years for countries with targets over multiple years, and assuming no change in funding levels for countries without quantitative targets.

When combined in this way, wealthy countries' pledges add up to approximately USD 57 billion a year – a little more than half of their collective commitment (see Annex B for details behind the calculation).

The Climate Finance Delivery plan published by wealthy countries in 2021 specifies that at least USD 82.5 billion of the USD 100 billion goal should be provided as public climate finance in 2023 (COP26 Presidency, 2021; OECD, 2021). The Delivery Plan does not specify how much of this amount is to be provided by each contributor, and it was drawn up on the basis of questionnaires submitted by OECD members which are not publicly available. Developed countries' second biennial communications

2 Italy's submission does not mention their commitment to provide USD 1.4 billion a year for five years, as presented in the Climate Finance Delivery Plan Progress Report (COP26 Presidency, 2021).

therefore offered an opportunity to present a clear pathway towards achieving their goal. But wealthy countries have thus missed this opportunity to present a detailed, robust pathway towards fulfilling their collective pledge, and to meaningfully ensure the predictability of their future support.

To date, developed countries have failed to live up to their collective promise in a timely manner. In addition, the indicative information provided by wealthy countries has not presented a robust and clear roadmap for delivering on their collective goal by 2023. This analysis highlights two factors contributing to this collective failure and the lack of predictability surrounding climate finance. The first is an aversion to tackling the issue of effort sharing or "fair shares". The second consists of the Parties' failure to consistently define verifiable, attainable pathways towards achieving their stated targets. Without robust plans for delivery, the last decade has shown that commitments can be broken and targets missed.

In the case of certain large climate finance contributors, there is evidence that countries are struggling to meet their targets. The United States has pledged to deliver USD 11.4 billion of climate finance annually by 2024, yet has approved just USD 2 billion in 2023 to date, including USD 1 billion of appropriated climate finance and a USD 1 billion pledge to the Green Climate Fund (Thwaites, Schmidt, and Guy, 2022; The White House, 2023). Another major contributor, Germany, has pledged EUR 6 billion annually from budgetary sources by 2025 – yet budget prognoses for 2022 and 2023 indicate that annual climate finance totals will be closer to EUR 4.3 billion (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022). In the event that the United States and Germany miss their 2023 annual targets by such margins, this will amount to an underspend of approximately USD 11 billion. Unless additional finance is found elsewhere, this shortfall could significantly reduce the likelihood that the USD 100 billion goal will be met.

Table 2 presents the summarised results of CARE's analysis of the second round of biennial communication submissions, based on the five criteria described above. As already discussed, the results highlight the fact that, despite some improvements, the various submissions largely fail to comply with the spirit and content of Article 9.5.

Rank	Party	Future level of support		Balanced adaptation, mitigation		The most vulnerable		Additionality		Mobilisation of further resources		Total score
		A. Clarity	B. Compliance	A. Clarity	B. Compliance	A. Clarity	B. Compliance	A. Clarity	B. Compliance	A. Clarity	B. Compliance	(0-20)
1	Luxembourg	1	1	0	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	12
-	New Zealand	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	12
2	Finland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	11
3	United Kingdom	1	1	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	10
4	Ireland	1	1	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	9
-	Denmark	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	9
-	Sweden	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	9
5	Canada	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
-	Belgium	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	8
6	Germany	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	7
-	Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	7
-	Norway	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	7
-	Australia	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	7
7	European Commission	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	6
-	United States	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	6
-	France	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	6
-	Switzerland	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	6
8	Italy	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
9	Austria	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	3
10	Spain	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
-	Japan	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
-	Portugal	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
11	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
-	Slovenia	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
12	Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
-	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Average score	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	6.0

Table 2: *Scores and ranking of biennial communications submitted by developed-country Parties on the basis of five analytical criteria used to assess the information provided on future climate finance. For each criterion the clarity and compliance of each country's ex-ante climate finance reporting has been scored. Parties are ranked first, by the total score allocated across the five criteria, and second, by the average score across both parameters of the "Future level of support" criterion, due to its primary importance for enhancing predictability.*

1.1. Future level of support

The **"future level of support"** criterion explores whether the various Parties' second biennial communications provide enhanced information on future levels of public financial support for developing countries. In response to the first question – whether the information provided increases the clarity of these projections – we find that the financial targets presented in the submissions fall into three broad groups:

1 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg and New Zealand present quantitative and qualitative information on the projected levels of climate finance to be provided to developing countries annually, over a multi-year period. The second biennial communications submitted by countries in this group contain two kinds of financial targets: (a) targets for the level of annual climate finance to be provided over a stated number of years (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France); and (b) targets for the total amount of climate finance to be provided over multiple years, together with a delivery plan detailing the annual amounts that will contribute to achieving this overall target (Luxembourg, New Zealand). Compared to other types of targets, annual targets for multiple years better enhance the predictability of future support for developing countries however, the targets in this group show varying degrees of progress beyond each Party's previous efforts and they should not be interpreted as the most ambitious pledges. Although these Parties do outline future annual contributions, only the information provided by Denmark contains any details of how this finance will add up to the country's fair share of the USD 100 billion goal.

2 Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission: These submissions present a certain amount of quantitative and qualitative information on the projected levels of climate finance to be provided to developing countries. This group's second biennial communications do suggest that each Party's climate finance will increase, to varying extents, over the coming years. However, the information provided does not specify annual totals across multiple years, or pathways towards fulfilling these commitments. Instead, this group's second-round biennial communications present two kinds of financial target: (a) periodic targets specifying the level of climate finance to be provided over a stated number of years (Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Commission); and (b) a specific annual target to be met by a stated reference year (Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States). Although Germany's submission includes a stated aim to provide its fair share of the collective USD 100 billion goal, none of these submissions show how these targets will equate to each Party's fair share.

3 Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia: Second-round biennial communications submitted by this group contain much less detail of future climate finance provisions. The submissions do not present detailed – let alone comprehensive – quantitative information on projected annual climate finance over multiple years. Generally speaking, the submissions include broad descriptions of future financial contributions to be provided via a selection of channels, highlights of past climate finance provisions, or outlines of projected levels of broader development finance. The information provided makes no significant contribution to enhancing the predictability of climate finance for developing countries.

In terms of the content and spirit of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, none of the Parties provide adequate information on or clarity concerning their future climate finance plans, let alone a holistic picture of the recipient countries, projects and programmes to be funded by future contributions.

In addition to analysing the nature and clarity of each Party's financial targets, as discussed above, the "future level of support" criterion also assesses whether these targets represent a progression beyond previous efforts, as stipulated in Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement. The types of targets, their baseline years, and the types of finance they include, are diverse. These differences hamper direct comparisons of the different Parties' pledges. However, for the purpose of placing each Party's targets within the context of their own past efforts to provide climate finance, Table 3 compares the financial targets to the average levels of climate finance reported annually by each developed country in their Fifth Biennial Report, or else to another reference amount where that comparison is not appropriate (see Annex B for further details).

Party	Target	Estimated increase in annual climate finance implied by target
Australia	AUD 2 billion over five years (2020/21-2024/25)	**24% *a***
Austria	No target specified	**-**
Belgium	At least EUR 135 million per year from 2022 onwards	**36% *a***
Canada	CAD 5.3 billion over five years (2021-2025)	**100% *b***
Czech Republic	No target specified	
Denmark	Scale up grant-based climate finance to at least 25% of development assistance from 2023 (expected to correspond to more than DKK 4 billion annually).	**133% *a***
European Union (excl. EIB)	EUR 27.8 billion in support of climate objectives over seven years (2021-2027)	**63% *a***
Finland	Around or above EUR 200 million per year (2024-2026)	**50% *a***
France	EUR 6 billion in public climate finance annually (2021-2025)	**14% *a***
Germany	EUR 6 billion from budgetary sources annually by 2025	**58% *a***
Greece	No target specified	**-**
Iceland	No second biennial communication submitted	**-**
Ireland	EUR 225 million annually by 2025	**189% *a***
Italy	No target specified	**-**
Japan	Up to approximately USD 71 billion of public and private climate finance over five years (2021-2025)	**15% *b***
Luxembourg	EUR 220 million of International Climate Finance over five years (2021 to 2025)	**64% *a***
Netherlands	Increase in public and private climate finance from EUR 1.25 billion in 2021 to EUR 1.80 billion in 2025	**44% *b***
New Zealand	NZD 1.3 billion over four years (2022-2025)	**223% *a***
Norway	NOK 14 billion per year by 2026 compared to NOK 7 billion in 2020	**126% *a***
Portugal	EUR 35 million per year by 2030	**360% *a***
Slovakia	No target specified	**-**
Slovenia	No target specified	**-**
Spain	EUR 1,350 million per year from 2025	**50% *b***
Sweden	SEK 15 billion per year by 2025	**118% *a***
Switzerland	CHF 400 million in public climate finance per year by 2024	**3% *b***
United Kingdom	GBP 11.6 billion over five years (2021-2025)	**99% *a***
United States	USD 11.4 billion per year by 2024	**300% *b***

Table 3: *The financial targets presented in developed countries' second biennial communications, plus an estimate of the increase in annual climate finance provisions they imply compared to previous levels (see Annex B for further details). Periodic targets, such as a target for providing a fixed amount of finance over multiple years, assume equal distribution of funding over the stated period.*
[a] Increase relative to the average annual amount of climate finance provided in 2019 and 2020, as reported by the Parties in Fifth Biennial Reports.
[b] Increase relative to a baseline year or amount specified by the Party (these targets are not suitable for comparing with information provided in ex-post Fifth Biennial Reports).

1.2. Balance between adaptation and mitigation support

Regarding the **"balance between adaptation and mitigation support"** criterion, the information provided in second biennial communication submissions, alongside ex-post climate finance reporting, indicates that the Parties conceptualise and act upon the "balance" stipulated in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement in five broad ways:

- Parties who strongly support improved balance in their future climate finance contributions because they recognise that adaptation objectives are severely underfunded and need to be prioritised. To redress this imbalance, these Parties state that they will prioritise adaptation, and have a track record of doing so: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
- Parties who support balance and consider it to mean near-parity between adaptation and mitigation finance totals. These Parties have a track record of providing their finance on the basis of such targets, and have stated that they will continue to do so in the future: Italy and the United Kingdom.
- Parties who provide information indicating that less than half their finance is likely to target adaptation (by, for example, referring to balance only in relation to particular types or sources of finance, or by doubling targets from currently low levels of adaptation support). These Parties do not have a track record of providing balanced support overall: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United States and the European Commission.[1]
- Parties who qualitatively support balance, or have a track record of providing balanced support, but who have not provided clear, robust information to describe how their future support will be balanced: Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden.
- Parties who do not refer to balance at all in their second biennial communication, or who explicitly state that they have no policy for achieving balance: Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia.

As most Parties do not provide detailed information on their plans for providing climate finance, they are unable to provide robust confirmation that their financial contributions will be balanced. Despite this, six Parties recognise the need to prioritise adaptation finance in view of currently imbalanced global efforts (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand). This highlights a degree of progress, given that only two Parties stated that they would prioritise adaptation in their first biennial communications (Ireland and New Zealand).

Only nine countries (Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Commission have presented quantitative adaptation finance targets in their submissions. When combined,

1 *While the grant-based financial support provided by the European Commission and European Development Fund includes strong support for balance in the sense of parity, statements of intent by the European Investment Bank indicate that just 15% of its finance will support adaptation by 2025.*

these pledges add up to approximately USD 14.3 billion of adaptation finance annually (see Annex C). However, of these targets, only those from Denmark, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the European Commission attempt to ensure that at least 50% of future public climate finance will go towards adaptation objectives. Even when assuming that the countries who have not outlined concrete adaptation finance targets will contribute the same proportion of their future climate finance towards adaptation as they did in 2019 and 2022 (as per Fifth Biennial Reports), the total rises to just USD 18.1 billion.

BOX 4 · BALANCING SUPPORT FOR ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION:

According to figures published by the OECD, developed countries provided and mobilised USD 28.4 billion of adaptation finance in 2020 and contributed, on average, just 24% of their finance for adaptation purposes in 2016-20 (OECD, 2021a; 2022). In contrast, UNEP now estimates that by 2030, USD 160-340 billion will be required annually to meet adaptation needs (UNEP, 2022). Because investments in adaptation largely create public benefits, financial returns can be difficult to obtain, meaning that adaptation action is best supported through grants. As a result, private (and in some cases, multilateral) finance for adaptation has not materialised in significant quantities; private and multilateral contributors continue to favour support for mitigation, primarily through loans (Oxfam, 2020). Any efforts to reorient private and multilateral contributors' investments will take time, and if the immediate and urgent need for adaptation support in developing countries is to be met, adaptation finance will have to be prioritised by other (public-sector) contributors. Denmark's second biennial communication includes a target to direct 60% of its climate finance towards adaptation objectives – a target that highlights the country's intention to redress current imbalances in international climate finance. Alongside efforts to encourage all contributors to provide adaptation finance, developed countries should follow Denmark's lead by allocating more than 50% of their climate finance to adaptation objectives.

Because the Glasgow Climate Pact called on developed countries to collectively double their climate finance from the levels observed in 2019 (UNFCCC, 2022), many Parties have committed to doing so in their submissions (such as Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). However, because many of these countries committed to increases in overall climate finance while having provided relatively low levels of adaptation support in 2019, these commitments do not always ensure balance in the sense of parity, between finance for adaptation and finance for mitigation.

For example, six of the largest climate finance providers – Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Norway and the United States – have asserted their commitment to the Glasgow Pact while at the same time indicating that they will not allocate 50% of their future finance to adaptation in consequence. While Germany refers to balanced finance from budgetary sources, other sources of German finance heavily prioritise mitigation. Canada, France, Japan, Norway and the United States all present targets for adaptation finance that suggest they are likely to provide less than 50% of their finance for adaptation objectives.

Due to the extent to which adaptation finance lags behind mitigation finance, and the tendency of multilateral and private climate finance contributors to focus on the latter, the information provided by developed countries does not suggest that the global imbalance between these two objectives will be redressed.

1.3. The most vulnerable

The analysis of **"the most vulnerable"** criterion assesses whether developed countries provide information showing that their future financial contributions will support developing-country-driven strategies, and that they will prioritise the most vulnerable countries and populations (in particular through gender-responsive support and targeted support for LDCs and SIDS).

BOX 5 · SUPPORTING THE MOST VULNERABLE:

Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) bear very little responsibility for the drivers of climate change. Despite this, they are highly exposed and often exceptionally vulnerable to its effects, but in most cases lack the capacity to respond robustly to its impacts. Adequate financial support, tailored to the specific needs of LDCs and SIDS, has therefore been a key component of climate finance decisions made under the UNFCCC. However, because many rich countries prefer loan-based support for mitigation, the financial needs of the most vulnerable countries are not being met. New Zealand's second biennial communication acknowledges the needs of particularly vulnerable countries by committing 50% of the country's total financial support to Pacific Island countries. New Zealand has further tailored its support for vulnerable nations by committing at least half of that finance to adaptation through grants and in-kind support. Other developed countries should follow New Zealand's example and provide significantly scaled-up, grant-based, tailored support to the most vulnerable countries and communities such as LDCs and SIDS.

Few Parties have provided comprehensive quantitative information on this criterion, but four groups emerged from the analysis:

- → Parties who qualitatively state that they will make a concerted effort to preferentially support the most vulnerable (i.e. LDCs and SIDS), and who have a track record of doing so: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
- → Parties who acknowledge the unique needs of the most vulnerable (i.e. LDCs and SIDS) and have incorporated support for them into their climate finance planning: Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the European Commission.
- → Parties who acknowledge the unique needs of the most vulnerable, but whose share of the climate-related development finance provided to LDCs and SIDS falls below the contribution of other developed countries: Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
- → Parties who express little or no acknowledgement of the unique needs of the most vulnerable and fail to highlight how their future support will address those needs: the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.

In general, while the issue is acknowledged in some biennial communications, enhanced and substantive information on the gender responsiveness of future climate support is routinely lacking. Submissions commonly dedicate one or two sentences to the issue of mainstreaming gender in development policy, or to gender equality as a cross-cutting objective. Only three Parties (Australia, Austria, and Sweden) provide quantitative evidence to show the previous levels of gender-responsiveness within their climate/development support, while just four Parties (France, Germany, New Zealand and the United States) present targets for gender-responsive climate/development finance or state their intention to increase the levels of gender-responsive finance.

BOX 6 · HOW GENDER-RESPONSIVE IS CLIMATE FINANCE?

Gender inequality is a root cause of poverty. In turn, climate change is making poverty worse. This means that for many women and girls, the chances of achieving a better life are threatened by a double injustice: climate change and gender inequality (CARE, 2014). Under the UNFCCC, the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender, with its Gender Action Plan, acknowledges the continuing need for gender mainstreaming across all relevant targets and goals for activities under the Convention (UNFCCC, n.d.a; 2019a). A number of climate finance contributors have provided qualitative information in their second biennial communications stating that gender is a cross-cutting consideration for their climate finance support. Data reported to the OECD illustrates the extent to which climate finance has been gender-responsive in the past (OECD, 2023). Over the four-year period 2017-2020, just half of OECD DAC Member States' bilateral climate-related development finance integrated gender-equality objectives. A closer inspection of these figures shows that 48% of wealthy countries' bilateral support targeted gender equality as a "significant" objective, meaning it was not the primary reason for undertaking an activity, whereas just 2% targeted gender equality as the primary or "principal" objective. In line with Oxfam's analysis of gender responsiveness in climate finance, this means that half of all bilateral climate finance provided by wealthy countries fails to consider gender at all (Oxfam, 2020).

1.4. Additionality

The **"additionality"** criterion assesses the information provided by the Parties to determine whether their climate finance is "new and additional" to their development support. Developed countries provide various conceptualisations and definitions, and yet – as was the case in the first round of biennial communications –most consider all climate finance contributions to be new and additional as long as they were not included in a previous year's reporting:

- → Sweden and Luxembourg consider only climate finance contributed over and above the UN target (to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA) as new and additional. Furthermore, Luxembourg's climate finance is additional to the country's own domestic target: to contribute 1.0% of GNI as ODA.
- → Norway fails to define additionality in its biennial communication, but does commit to providing 1% of its GNI as ODA.
- → New Zealand specifies that NZD 0.8 billion of their NZD 1.3 billion target can be regarded as new and additional, because it was appropriated from the country's Climate Emergency Response Fund established in 2021, together with proceeds from the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme.
- → Finland and Canada consider all their climate finance to be new and additional, as their total climate finance contributions continue to exceed those made in baseline year 2009, when the Copenhagen Accord was signed. Similarly, Austria and Switzerland define all their climate finance as new and additional because their contributions have increased over the longer term.
- → Portugal states that its climate finance is new and additional because it comes from the country's Environmental Fund, a dedicated instrument for financing ODA projects.
- → In the context of annual climate finance figures, most countries' biennial communications define all climate finance as new and additional where it has not been previously reported. Parties taking this approach include Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission.
- → Australia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain do not provide any definitions of new and additional finance in their second biennial communications.

The submission from Belgium conceptualises additionality in various ways when describing various portions of its climate finance. However, very little of Belgium's climate finance has been found to be new and additional to its development support (CARE, 2022).

As was the case in the first round of biennial communications, only the submissions from Luxembourg and Sweden explicitly define new and

2 Based on the premise that 50% of the climate-related development finance reported with a "significant" Rio marker represents climate finance.

additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. Both these Parties define new and additional climate finance as climate-related finance provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA annually.

In general, Parties' definitions of new and additional climate finance remain inadequate. CARE has shown that just 45% of climate finance provided by developed countries exceeded the levels of development finance provided in 2009, prior to the signing of the Copenhagen Accord, while just 6% of the finance provided exceeded the ODA target of 0.7% of GNI (CARE, 2022).

The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report states that one of the key criteria agreed for climate finance was that "climate financing should be 'new and additional' and not at the cost of SDGs. Resources prioritising climate at the cost of non-climate development finance increases the vulnerability of a population for any given level of climate shocks, and additionality of climate financing is thus essential." (IPCC, 2022).

For many developing countries, external public resources such as ODA remain essential. It is therefore vital that wealthy countries meet their commitments to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA whilst also providing climate finance in addition to that target. Doing so will enhance the predictability of support for both climate and development objectives. Collectively, developed countries provided just 0.33% of their GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023).

1.5. Mobilisation of further resources

The final criterion, **"mobilisation of further resources"**, assesses whether Parties have provided clear details of their plans to mobilise private-sector resources, and the extent to which their climate support is consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience. The details of mobilisation plans vary significantly from one submission to another.

Parties such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission do provide information concerning their plans for mobilising private climate finance in the future. These Parties provide details of the financial instruments and channels which will be used to engage with the private sector.

Many biennial communications focus on providing examples of the ways in which private finance has been mobilised in the past, while failing to provide detailed plans for mobilising private-sector resources in the future. Parties who do not present detailed mobilisation plans in their second biennial communications include Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.

There are considerable differences in the level of detail provided in the various developed countries' descriptions of their plans for mobilising private-sector resources. While certain countries with state-owned development finance institutions present those institutions' climate-related investment targets (e.g. Finnfund in Finland; British International Investments in the United Kingdom), other countries tend to provide purely qualitative plans.

In their biennial communication submissions, developed countries are expected to provide information showing how their climate finance is helping developing countries in their efforts to make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse-gas emissions and climate-resilient development. However, it is first and foremost the non-development-related domestic and international finance from these countries that is jeopardising their alignment with Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement.

Ten Parties – Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States – have taken the opportunity to acknowledge the full scope of Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement in their second biennial communications. These Parties provide at least some information on the extent to which they are attempting to align flows of domestic and international finance with the Paris Agreement. Despite this, one of the most detailed and far-reaching submissions – Luxembourg's – only commits to converting one-fifth of the country's financial flows into "green flows" by 2025.

Section 2 below presents individual assessments of the second biennial communications submitted by each developed country.

SECTION 2

ANALYSIS OF PARTY SUBMISSIONS

Luxembourg

Luxembourg's second biennial communication provides some indicative information outlining the future levels of climate finance they aim to provide. The submission outlines a quantitative multiyear commitment to provide 220 million EUR of new and additional climate finance from 2021-2025, an increase from the 120 million EUR committed from 2014-2020. However, detailed information has not been presented regarding the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded or how Luxembourg will target the most vulnerable, reducing the enhanced predictability and clarity the submission provides for developing countries. While broadly outlining that gender is considered during project selection and evaluation, Luxembourg does not provide further substantive information in its submission to highlight how future support will be gender-responsive. And while the submission commits to ensure *"an overall balanced impact"* between adaptation and mitigation results from Luxembourg's climate finance, it provides no quantitative or qualitative information to show how and when objective-specific commitments will be achieved. Most of Luxembourg's previous climate finance has been reported as cross-cutting in nature, meaning changes in reporting practices would be needed to accurately determine the adaptation-mitigation split of future funding. Finally, information has been provided to indicate that the Party's climate finance will be in excess of the 1% of GNI the country extends as ODA, and therefore can be considered "new and additional".

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Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Luxembourg provides some quantitative information to outline its future climate finance support, and qualitative information regarding financial instrument use, programmes to be supported and the groups of recipients it will provide finance to. Luxembourg commits to providing 220 million EUR from 2021-2025, an increase of 20 million EUR as compared to their first biennial communication. Annual projected totals have been provided to show a pathway to achieve the commitment, yet no reference is made to outline how, or whether, the commitment fulfils Luxembourg's fair share of 100 billion USD pledge. Regarding recipient countries, the submission states there is "*no general restriction in country eligibility*", and that provisions maintain a strong focus on support to LDCs, SIDS, and highly exposed low-income countries, alongside its nine Climate Dialogue Partners. The information provided does not provide complete clarity on how much finance the proposed recipients will receive, or complete information on the specific projects or programmes which will be funded.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Luxembourg's submission no longer applies quotas for its provision of adaptation, mitigation, and REDD+ finance (which were noted as 40%, 40% and 20%, respectively, in the country's first biennial communication). Instead, Luxembourg's new strategy includes a "*rebalancing towards the intrinsic relationship between three pillars: mitigation, adaptation, and REDD+*", aiming to achieve "an overall balanced impact" between objectives. In its Fifth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC, Luxembourg reported 70%, 20% and 10% of its climate finance to cross-cutting, adaptation and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Luxembourg makes no commitment to make efforts to redress the imbalance in support currently seen globally, instead focusing on complementary actions which support both adaptation and mitigation. Regarding financial instruments, the submission states that "*a large part of adaptation projects, capacity development, institutional strengthening projects and early project preparation activities, call for plain grants*", and that Luxembourg intends to broaden its use of different instruments, particularly in partnership with the private sector.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, Luxembourg's development programming uses five main selection criteria to allocate its International Climate Finance, one of which is "*transformation, innovation and lasting outcomes*" which includes an analysis of national priorities, political will, and the needs of the beneficiaries. On gender-responsiveness, the submission states: "*A special focus is put on the gender component during not only for the project evaluation, but also in terms of the applicant organization*" yet detail is lacking. Regarding the targeting of the most vulnerable, Luxembourg states that around half of its bilateral climate finance supports LDCs, SIDS and highly exposed low-income countries. The LDC and SIDS shares of Luxembourg's climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2019-2020 were approximately 39% and 5%, respectively, both well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Despite this, no recipients are explicitly referenced when outlining Luxembourg's future climate finance provisions, and no enhanced, indicative information has been provided at the project level. In general, little quantitative information has been provided to show how and to what degree climate finances will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Luxembourg defines new and additional finance, stating that: *"'New and additional' means that the resources that Luxembourg commits to deliver are not taken over from earlier commitments and are thus 'new'. 'Additional' means that they come 'on top of' Luxembourg's ODA commitments and thus are not 'double counted' or draining on other resources dedicated to poverty eradication"*. Luxembourg's submission commits to continue to provide both 1% of its GNI as ODA and new and additional climate finance in the future. Luxembourg provided 0.99% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a), and has consistently provided its climate finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI between 2011-2018 (CARE, 2022).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning the mobilisation of private finance, the submission refers to Luxembourg's 2018 Sustainable Finance Roadmap and its forthcoming revision, stating: *"Luxembourg's [International Climate Finance] strategy will be oriented towards existing and new financial instruments... and leverage new and additional funding, including from private sources"*. The biennial communication also references the country's financial centre's commitment to convert 20% of the country's finance flows into *"green flows"* by 2025. Yet no indicative, quantitative information has been provided as an estimate of the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Luxembourg's public funding, and little detail is provided regarding the objectives and destination of such finance, or the criteria which would guide that. Luxembourg's climate finance provisions are stated to be in accordance with the objectives of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, including making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions, and climate-resilient development. However, further substantive detail outlining how they are in accordance is not provided.

New Zealand

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New Zealand's second biennial communication submission offers some enhanced quantitative and qualitative information to increase the predictability of its future support for developing countries, which will be scaled-up. The submission provides projected annual totals to 2024 and commits to providing NZ$1.3 billion across 2022-2025. The submission provides some broad details regarding the projects, programming, and regionality within its future support, yet lacks more substantive detail. No clear and meaningful definition of "new and additional" climate finance has been provided in the biennial communication, despite New Zealand outlining its use of innovative sources of finance to help ensure some additionality in its support. The information provided includes a strong commitment towards balance between mitigation and adaptation, and that grant-based support, vulnerability, and gender form core concerns in providing support, with two-thirds of future finances to target highly vulnerable SIDS.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	New Zealand's biennial communication provides some qualitative and quantitative information on indicative annual projections of climate finance. The submission states New Zealand's new international climate-related finance commitment will total a minimum of NZ$ 1.3 billion (approximately 0.8 billion USD) from 2022-25. Annual projections are stated as indicative yet have been provided for 2023 and 2024 alongside information indicating that finance in the design and pipeline stage are on track to deliver the overall pledge. These indicative pledges evidence an increase in future climate finance provisions as compared to previous commitments, yet the submission does not provide information on how, or whether, New Zealand will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal. In addition, because around 40% of the financial target could be finance which is only partially climate-relevant, the total amounts of climate finance being provided could be significantly lower. Regarding financial instruments New Zealand's climate-related support is primarily funded from ODA and is delivered through grants or in-kind support. Regarding recipient countries, the submission states that half of New Zealand's support will be provided to developing countries in the Pacific region, yet that New Zealand also does not have a pre-determined list of priority sectors for climate-related support. The submission does provide some details concerning programming, but a detailed, long-term, holistic breakdown of future finances concerning specific recipient countries and projects is lacking.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning balanced provisions of climate finance, the submission maintains a firm pledge to preferentially support adaptation activities: *"At least 50% of New Zealand's climate finance for 2022-25 will be allocated to adaptation. This recognises the importance of adaptation finance to climate-vulnerable countries such as SIDS and the current collective failure to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance as stressed in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement."* The submission adds that from 2022: *"Of the NZ$561.3 million of committed activities, approximately 62 percent is tagged as principally adaptation, 24 percent as both adaptation and mitigation, and 14 percent as principally mitigation"* and that New Zealand is *"committed to fulfilling commitments from the Glasgow Climate Pact, which urged developed countries to collectively double adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025."* In its Fifth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC, New Zealand reported 53%, 10% and 36% of its climate finance as targeting cross-cutting, mitigation and adaptation objectives, respectively. The submission recognises the need for grant-based resources, stating: *"New Zealand's climate-related support is primarily funded from ODA and is delivered through grants or in-kind support."*
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	New Zealand's submission maintains a focus on support for developing country-driven strategies. The biennial communication *"emphasises the recognition of partner countries' sovereignty, mana, agency, and expertise in determining their own climate change mitigation and adaptation priorities."* The submission commits New Zealand to providing half of its provision to developing countries in the pacific, with additional finance for LDCs in Asia and Africa. Information is lacking on specific recipients, programmes, and projects to be funded. The LDC and SIDS shares of the climate-related development finance provided by New Zealand to the OECD in 2019-2020 were 18% and 77%, just below and well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). Concerning gender-responsive climate finances, the submission states that New Zealand's approach to inclusive development focuses on, among other things, *"advancing gender equality and women's empowerment, and child and youth well-being"* and that New Zealand aim to increase investments of development finance with a principal Gender Equality Marker to 4% of overall development spending – no information is provided to focus on climate finance specifically.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	New Zealand's biennial communication submission states that climate finance has remained an important part of a growing International Development Cooperation (IDC) budget. The submission outlines that NZ$800 million of their climate finance pledge is "new and additional" as it comes on top their IDC spend and has been *"appropriated from New Zealand's Climate Emergency Response Fund, established in 2021 with proceeds from the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme"*. While this makes use of innovative sources of finance, the submission does not evidence that all country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not fully in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, New Zealand provided 99.7% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, yet none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). New Zealand provided 0.28% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Leveraging climate finance from the private sector is stated as a key goal of New Zealand's International Climate Finance Strategy. However, the information provided does not resemble a clear plan to mobilise further resources in the future, or to provide indicative quantitative information on the amounts expected to be mobilised. New Zealand's submission *"recognises the critical importance of making all finance flows consistent with... Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement"*. However, the submission lacks detail and does not provide concrete information indicating how financial flows will be consistent with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

Finland

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Finland's second biennial communication includes some information to enhance the predictability of the country's scaled-up future climate finance for developing countries, including the addition of a quantitative target of 200 million EUR annually from 2022-2026. The submission provides some indicative qualitative information regarding the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be funded, and Finland has produced a delivery plan for the goal. Finland's biennial communication includes a weak statement towards balanced support for mitigation and adaptation objectives but has not historically provided clear information in Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC to evidence a record of doing so. The share of grant-based support within Finland's climate finance has historically fluctuated yet has decreased since 2017. The submission outline that because Finland's climate finance has increased beyond the amounts provided in 2009, all climate finance can be considered to be "new and additional". However, this definition of additionality does not prevent increases in climate finance displacing ODA, which remains below 0.7% of GNI.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Finland's submission provides some enhanced, indicative, and quantitative information on projected levels of future climate finance. Alongside the information presenting a selection of multiyear commitments to multilateral organisations, Finland's Plan for the Implementation of Finland's Public International Climate Finance outlines that Finland will provide *"around or above"* 200 million EUR annually in climate finance from 2022-2026, subject to annual budget approvals. The figure represents an increase from the annual provisions provided in 2019 and 2020. Finland does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal. Concerning information on recipient countries, Finland's biennial communication states: *"Finland focuses its support to LDCs and fragile states"*, while further outlining partner countries and their Country Programmes alongside strategic objectives in certain sectors. Information has not been provided to outline how future finances are planned to be distributed between long-term partners, and limited information has been provided regarding specific projects and programmes to be funded outside of the Country Programmes.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning balance, the information provided states: *"Finland aims to balance support between adaptation and mitigation... This broad picture is not expected to change in the future."* However, across 2019-2020, Finland provided 65%, 31% and 5% of its climate finance towards cross-cutting, mitigation and adaptation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission adds that, from 2022 onwards, grant-based bilateral support will be equally split between adaptation and mitigation. However, there is a lack of detail to ensure that balance will be maintained throughout the new financial commitment. This is particularly important due to the low proportion of Finland's climate finance currently being provided using grants (UNFCCC, 2023). Finland's biennial communication does not explicitly acknowledge the need for grant-based support, nor the historic and ongoing imbalance within international climate finance provisions regarding adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning vulnerability, the information provided says that Finland prioritises LDCs and fragile states and outlines long-term LDC partner countries. However, only 13% and less than 0.1% of the climate-related development finance Finland reported to the OECD in 2019 and 2020 targeted LDCs and SIDS, respectively, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). It is acknowledged that this is, in part, due to the high proportion of Finland's funding which is channelled multilaterally. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: *"Finland follows the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by donor and partner developing countries, which stresses the ownership and alignment of the partner country in development cooperation."* Gender equality is referred to as both a long-standing component, and an established cross-cutting component, of the Finnish development strategy.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Finland's definition of additionality states that as climate finance has increased above the level which was provided in a baseline year of 2009 (EUR 26.8 million), all can be considered as new and additional. Despite referencing a specific baseline, this definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Finland provided 40% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Finland provided 0.47% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning the information provided in support of plans to mobilise further private-sector finance, Finland's biennial communication outlines the mobilisation of private finance as *"an emerging part of Finland's policies"*. The submission highlights Finnfund and Finnpartnership as of particular importance to mobilisation. Finnfund is stated to provide risk capital, while Finnpartnership creates links between businesses. Through the investment funding budget line (on top of ODA budget lines), the submission states: *"During 2020-23 about 500 million euros will be invested out of which at least 75 per cent will be channelled into climate change related investments."* The commitment made is therefore the same as the commitment made by Finland in 2015. In addition, the submission states: *"Finnfund has adopted a new statement on climate and energy according to which it will make EUR 1 billion worth of new investments in climate finance by 2030."* The submission therefore provides some quantitative (yet less qualitative) information regarding its plans to mobilise private climate finance. Concerning the provision of financial flows consistent with low emissions and climate resilience, the submission indicates that Article 2.1.c and low-emissions development have become a consideration in broader Finnish economic activities through the Party's engagement with the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action.

The United Kingdom

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The UK's second biennial communication submission includes some indicative information outlining scaled-up provisions of climate finance up to 2025, but lacks detail to significantly enhance predictability and clarity for developing country Parties. For example, qualitative and quantitative information regarding the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be funded is largely lacking. The submission includes an aim to continue to support balanced mitigation and adaptation objectives, yet no information has been provided to ensure that adaptation will continue to be provided through grants in future support. On vulnerability, the UK's biennial communication provides limited qualitative information, though case studies highlight initiatives focused on LDCs and SIDS. The submission effectively indicates that all public climate finance is considered to be "new and additional" as it has not been reported in previous years. From a recipient country perspective, such a definition of additionality does not protect against increases in UK climate finance displacing ODA, particularly in the context of decreasing ODA budgets (Loft and Brien, 2022).

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	The UK's biennial communication provides some indicative qualitative and quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate action: *"We are delivering on our pledge to double our International Climate Finance (ICF) contribution from £5.8 billion to £11.6 billion over 2021/22 – 2025/26."* This five-year commitment represents an increase in climate finance provisions, compared to previous levels. However, aside from the multiyear commitment, detailed information is lacking with regards to specific recipient countries, programmes, and projects, and how the pledged finance will be channelled. The UK does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	On providing balance between adaptation and mitigation support, the submission recognises that current adaptation finance is insufficient globally, and states: *"We will continue to strike a balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation, and will triple our provision of climate finance for adaptation from 2019, to £1.5 billion in 2025, demonstrating our commitment to the doubling set out in the Glasgow Climate Pact."* The submission also states that 47% of the UK's climate finance between 2016-2021 targeted adaptation, and that the UK will continue to provide balanced support in the future. Despite this, there is a lack of clarity regarding the recipients and the projects to be funded through adaptation support. Across 2019-2020, the UK provided 36%, 20% and 44% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Most of the UK's adaptation finance in 2019 and 2020 was provided as grants, but there are no commitments regarding the level of grant-based support for adaptation in the future.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	On country-driven strategies, the UK's biennial communication states: *"Programmes are informed by detailed country development diagnostics and designed and delivered in consultation with local communities and in partnership with key institutions, local and national governments, and where relevant with other major donors"*. Concerning vulnerability, the submission outlines that adaptation support to the most vulnerable, including LDCs, SIDS, and African countries will be prioritised, and that support aims at: *"prioritising the strengthening of adaptation to the effects of climate change, supporting in particular those most vulnerable to shocks worldwide."* The submission provides information on five programmes targeting vulnerability. No quantitative information is provided regarding the amounts of finance to be extended to LDCs and SIDS, while research has highlighted that the UK's aid cuts have impacted LDCs the most (CGD, 2023). The LDC and SIDS shares of the UK's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were around 21% and 0.2%, above and below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). On gender-responsiveness, the submission states that the UK: *"remains committed to meeting women's and girls' needs and priorities, and advancing gender equality, through our climate finance"*, in line with the Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Concerning additionality, the UK's biennial communication states that its commitment to double its climate finance provision: *"is additional to the £5.8 billion pledged and spent up to March 2021."* This definition of additionality does not adhere to the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. Between 2011-2018, the UK provided all its climate finance on top of the level of level of development finance the country provided in 2009, prior to the Copenhagen Accord, yet just 2% was in excess of the UN's 0.7% target (CARE, 2022). However, because the UK's climate finance budgets have been earmarked from within total ODA budgets, and because the UK government has moved to reduce its ODA spend from 0.7% of GNI to 0.5%, there is a likelihood that increased provisions of climate finance will displace ODA in the future. The United Kingdom provided 0.5% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Although the UK outline examples of how they will further mobilise private climate finance in the future, detailed information regarding indicative quantitative figures are lacking in in the biennial communication. The information provided includes a commitment to mobilise finance, and a recognition of private resources as important. The submission refers to the UK's involvement in Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JEFTs) and to the general role of the UK's climate finance "to leverage and mobilise private finance by reducing the barriers preventing the deployment of commercial finance". Concerning adherence to Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, and the Paris Alignment of support, the submission states: *"Without the fundamental shift in the financial system as a whole, the climate goals of the Paris Agreement cannot be met. As set out in our 2019 Green Finance Strategy, we will champion both the systemic greening of the financial system and mobilising finance towards green and resilient sectors globally."* As a member of the OECD DAC, the UK jointly declared that it would align all its ODA with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Ireland

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Ireland's second biennial communication provides some enhanced information to better ensure the predictability of the country's future climate finance for developing countries. Ireland's submission outlines a high-level commitment to provide 255 million EUR of climate finance per year by 2025, yet does not provide a further breakdown of this commitment. Little quantitative information is provided to indicate how this finance will be channelled, or which initiatives are to be funded in future. The submission indicates that Ireland's focus on adaptation finance will continue in the future for the most vulnerable nations, including LDCs, SIDS, and fragile states. Ireland's second biennial communication also states that Ireland's climate finance is grant-based in nature and that future commitments will continue to be met through ODA provisions. The submission indicates that all public climate finance is considered to be "new and additional" due to the annual budgeting process carrying no assumption that funding made in any given year will be available in a subsequent year. This definition does not guard against the redirection of flows from other important development sectors as climate finance increases.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Ireland's second biennial communication lays out how Ireland is committed to doubling the proportion of Ireland's ODA that counts as climate finance by 2030. The report also outlines that Ireland further committed at COP26 to a quantitative target of a minimum of 225 million EUR per year by 2025. Ireland's climate finance pledges are to be met through ODA budgets and ODA eligible funding, and will come through a range of different channels of delivery including bilateral, CSO partners, and multilaterals. While the report states that Ireland anticipates greater funding for technology transfer and capacity building efforts in the future, it points primarily to their Climate Finance Roadmap which specifies the key thematic sectors to be prioritised up to 2025 by Ireland's ODA. These include: Adaptation and Resilience, Loss and Damage, Oceans and the Sustainable Blue Economy, Biodiversity and Nature-Based Solutions, Climate and Security, Innovation and Entrepreneurship and Capacity Building. While these priority themes are available, the report does not outline multi-annual budgets for climate finance, nor does it specify the allocation of such resources to developing countries. Instead, the report relies on historical commitments, such as funding for the Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility, while outlining that the vast majority of its climate finance goes to sub-Saharan Africa. The submission states that Ireland is reluctant to legislate for allocations due to the fragility of Irish GNI. Ireland does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Ireland will maintain its focus on support adaptation and resilience to climate change, with a specific focus on the most climate vulnerable countries. Historic statistics are provided as evidence for this focus, with 75% of 2020 climate finance going towards adaptation, with 22% as cross-cutting, and 3% mitigation finance. The submission recognises the bias towards mitigation across global climate finance, and states a strong adaptation focus in Ireland's support. The biennial communication outlines the prioritisation of grant-based climate finance, and Ireland's past climate finance has been provided nearly entirely through grants. Across 2019-2020, Ireland provided 39%, 60% and 1% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023).
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Ireland's second biennial communication states that its climate finance *"priorities grant based climate finance for LDCs, SIDS, and fragile states"*. The submission adds that all climate finance will be guided by Ireland's development policy, A Better World, which includes the principal of *"leaving no one behind and contributing to sustainable development for the most climate vulnerable people, communities and countries"*. With the majority of Ireland's climate finance flowing to sub-Saharan Africa, climate finance provisions are primarily on LDCs. However, there is a reliance on ex-post reporting in the submission to evidence this, for example through citing initiatives such as the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the NAP Global Network. The LDC and SIDS shares of Ireland's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were around 56% and 2%, well above and just below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). The submission states that Ireland *"will continue to engage in gender sensitive climate action"*, as well as recognising the gendered impacts of climate change and linking this to their priorities to channel climate finance to sectors and interventions which are of greatest relevance to women. The report also notes particular sectors that can often be gender blind, such as those primarily receiving mitigation support, while indicating that such sectors need to have a gender lens applied to them. The report lays out the principles for future action to deliver for the most vulnerable, without providing specific quantities.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Ireland's definition of "new and additional" finance is provided in the context of Ireland's national budgeting system: *"Ireland's approach to budgeting carries no assumption that funding made available in any given year will again be available in a subsequent year. Consequently, with the exception of a few heavily-caveated multiannual funding arrangements, such as GEF and GCF, all public climate finance provided by Ireland annually is considered new and additional."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. Ireland has not historically provided any of its climate finance on top of the level of development finance it provided in 2009, or in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Ireland provided 0.3% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Ireland notes that *"opportunities to engage the private sector in climate action will be explored"*. Historically, Ireland's climate finance has not prioritised the mobilisation of private sector finance, though it is stated that work to identify the most appropriate options for private sector engagement will be undertaken for climate action post-2025. Ireland plans to "climate proof" its ODA to help align flows with the Paris Agreement. Other than these comments, the report relies on backward looking information, such as citing the Africa Agri-Food Development Programme which matches Irish agri-business to companies in sub-Saharan Africa for innovative partnerships, as evidence of Paris Alignment.

Denmark

9

Denmark's second biennial communication provides some enhanced information to better ensure the predictability of the country's future climate finance for developing countries and shows significant improvements in comparison to the country's first biennial communication. The submission outlines that Denmark aims to deliver 25% of its development assistance to developing countries in the form of grant-based climate finance, which is said to equate to 4 billion DKK per year from 2023 onwards. The submission also refers to multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions as evidence of its future support. In addition, Denmark outlines its aim to provide 60% of its public climate finance towards adaptation objectives. Concerning the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be financed, sufficient detail to enhance predictability is largely lacking. However, Denmark does have a record of providing grant-based support with a significant focus on vulnerable countries and regions such as the LDCs. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of "new and additional" climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Denmark's second biennial communication provides quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources. The submission states that from 2023 onwards *"grant-based climate finance will constitute at least 25 % of our direct assistance to developing countries (expected to constitute around DKK 4 billion annually)".* This submission adds: *"Including mobilized climate finance, Denmark will contribute at least 1 % of the collective 100 billion USD goal."* By committing to provide a proportion of the 100 billion USD goal, Denmark has outlined the finance it considers to be its fair share of the collective target. Denmark outlines the country partners it will primarily work with, which are focussed in Africa, as well as giving examples of some climate-specific multilateral institutions it supports. Despite this, less information has been provided regarding the amounts and characteristics of the finance to be provided to specific recipient countries, through all financial channels utilised by Denmark.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	The submission presents Denmark's aim that: *"at least 60 % of [Denmark's] climate finance will be earmarked for adaptation".* This represents a significant improvement on Denmark's previous submission, which did not contain a specific quantitative target on adaptation. The target shows an implicit awareness that there is a bias towards mitigation in international climate finance, and that grant-based public sources need to be targeted towards adaptation objectives to redress this imbalance. The submission further states that the new Danish strategy for development cooperation, The World We Share, focuses on support to adaptation and resilience building in poor and vulnerable countries. This focus states that Denmark will aim to support and prioritise the most vulnerable through its adaptation support. Despite this, quantitative information regarding the future adaptation support to be provided to specific recipients is lacking. Reporting in Denmark's Fifth Biennial Report shows that 34%, 27% and 39% of the country's climate finance targeted adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023).
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Denmark's second biennial communication states: *"Public grant-based financing in particular targets poor and vulnerable countries and regions with a particular focus on LDCs and Africa. The Danish policies and priorities recognizes that poor and vulnerable countries are particularly challenged by the impacts of climate change and need support to build resilience and integrate adaptation to climate change in all aspects the development planning process."* The submission adds: *"As Danish development assistance has a particular focus on supporting poor and fragile countries and populations that are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, there will be an increased emphasis on support aiming at building resilience and reducing vulnerability in these contexts."* The Danish submission also acknowledges the specific needs of LDCs and SIDS, and of country-driven strategies. However, as little information has been provided on projected future finance, particularly regarding the programmes and projects to be funded, the predictability of support for the most vulnerable is not significantly enhanced. The LDC share of Denmark's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 was 23%, above the share provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Denmark reported no climate-related development finance in support of SIDS across the same years (ibid.). Gender equality is referred to as a cross-cutting priority in climate-related development, and is clearly outlined in broader development policy, but the submission lacks explicit details concerning gender responsive climate finance.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Concerning new and additional finance, the information considers *"finance for climate change adaptation or mitigation activities within the reporting period and finance that was not previously reported to UNFCCC as new and additional finance."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Denmark provided 19% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while 72% was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). However, from 2016 onwards, only very marginal amounts of Denmark's climate finance have been provided on top of the 0.7% target due to the country's ODA hovering around 0.7% of the country's GNI (CARE, 2022). In 2021, Denmark provided 0.71% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	The information provided in the submission states that the efforts of Denmark's International Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) to mobilise private-sector finance will be continued. Noting that *"through instruments managed by our development financing institution, IFU, climate relevant investments of DKK 0.5–1 billion have been mobilized annually since 2015".* Predictability is slightly enhanced with the statement that, *"for mobilized climate finance it is assumed that future levels will be at least the same as today's level".* Concerning finance consistent with low-emissions development, the information provided states: *"Further, efforts will be strengthened to ensure that the entire development cooperation portfolio supports development pathways that are consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement, and that a "do-no-harm" principle in relation to climate and environmental global goals is applied."*

Sweden

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Sweden's second biennial communication provides some information to better ensure the predictability of their future financial support for climate activities in developing countries, yet clarity regarding future amounts is lacking. The submission includes a commitment to provide 8 billion SEK across 2022-2026 for environment, climate, and biodiversity related development activities. The commitment is therefore not entirely climate focused, and, on an annual basis, is significantly less than the total climate finance reported by Sweden to the UNFCCC for 2020. Alongside this commitment, the submission also references Sweden's aim to double climate finance by 2025, relative to 2019. In addition, the biennial communication provides information evidencing that climate finance is currently in excess of the 0.7% of GNI provided by Sweden as ODA, and that it is therefore "new and additional". Despite this, Sweden has not committed to continuing to provide 1% of its GNI as ODA in the future. A core component of Sweden's submission highlights that all financial support takes developing country priorities as a point of departure, and therefore no explicit commitments are included in support of balanced mitigation and adaptation finance or the prioritisation of the most vulnerable. However, in the past Sweden have shown high support for adaptation, LDCs, and grant shares within climate finance totals, alongside a high degree of gender-responsiveness.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Statements in Sweden's biennial communication provide some indicative qualitative and quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries: *"Sweden's global development cooperation in the areas of environment, climate and biodiversity for 2022–2026 sets aside 8 billion Swedish kronor for the period."* The financial commitment therefore includes climate finance alongside other forms of ODA. Sweden committed around 7.4 billion SEK of climate-specific finance in 2020 alone (UNFCCC, 2023), and therefore this indicative information does not provide a complete picture of the Party's future finances. The submission does refer to the Swedish government's aim, stated in 2021, to double climate finance by 2025, relative to 2019 levels (to around 15 billion SEK annually). The submission does not evidence how, or whether, the pledge fulfils Sweden's fair share of the collective 100 billion USD commitment. The information provided does not commit to continue to provide 1% of GNI as ODA in the future, with Sweden decoupling future ODA provisions from GNI (CGD, 2022). The information in the submission notes that the amounts that will be provided for climate action strongly depend upon the requests and dialogues initiated by developing countries. The submission focuses on the responsiveness of Swedish support, stating: *"Priority countries are those developing countries that prioritise climate action."* Aside from some information outlining funding to selected multilateral organisations, detailed information concerning the projects, programmes, and recipients to be funded is therefore lacking, and the submission has not meaningfully improved the predictability of climate finance for recipient countries.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	There are no assurances provided in the submission which state that Sweden will ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance, or that Sweden will work to address the global imbalance in climate finance provisions. Instead, Sweden focuses on the responsiveness of its financial provisions to the needs of recipient countries, who maintain a high degree of ownership over the funding. The adaptation, mitigation, and cross-cutting shares of the climate finance reported in 2019 and 2020 through Sweden's Fifth Biennial Report were 28%, 14% and 57%, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). All of Sweden's past adaptation support has been grant-based, although the submission lacks detail and clarity concerning future support. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation, despite Sweden having a track record of providing such support.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Country-driven strategies are outlined as a fundamental element of Swedish developmental and climate support. The submission states: *"Broad-based local and national ownership is key to sustainable development and sustainable results from climate finance. The countries' and organisations' own needs, priorities and strategies are weighed into the bilateral strategies, and constitute a fundamental entry point in all of Sida's operations."* The submission states that climate change will increase vulnerability, and that poor and vulnerable people are targeted through Sweden's support. Outside of outlining support to the LDCF, LDCs and SIDS are not mentioned in Sweden's second biennial communication. The LDC and SIDS shares of Swedish climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 11% and less than 0.1%, respectively, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). On gender-responsiveness, the biennial communication states: *"In 2021, approximately 81 percent of the Swedish bilateral climate finance was considered gender integrated."* Sweden has provided little qualitative information on the gender-responsiveness of its future support yet does voluntarily report on the gender-responsiveness of its climate finance to the EU and UNFCCC. Unlike in its first biennial communication, the submission does not refer to the role of feminist foreign policy in ensuring gender-responsive support, as the policy has not been adopted under the new government. No recipients or income groups are explicitly referred to in the context of Sweden's future climate finance, and no enhanced, indicative information has been provided at the project level. As a result, no quantitative information has been provided showing how climate finances will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Sweden defines new and additional climate finance as that which has not been reported in previous years and is over the 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA: *"Sweden has long stated that our climate finance is new and additional, since the finance we provide is additional to the UN 0.7 percent target."* Despite recently decoupling ODA and GNI, and despite making no strong commitment to continue to provide climate finance on top of the 0.7% target, Sweden provided 99.8% of its climate finance above the 0.7% threshold between 2011-2018, while 95% was provided on top of the level of development finance the country provided in 2009 (CARE, 2022). Sweden provided 0.91% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Information is included stating public financial resources will continue to mobilise private finance: *"[The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency] continuously works to enhance mobilisation of additional climate finance and works with a number of different instruments, such as guarantees, Public Private Development Partnerships (PPDPs) and challenge funds."* The submission also states that *"Further efforts could and should be done globally and nationally by all Parties to ensure thorough application of the Addis Ababa principles on development finance."* No indicative, quantitative information has been provided regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised, or the countries in which these activities will take place. Concerning finance compatible with Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, the submission states: *"We support countries in enhancing and implementing their Nationally Determined Contributions"*, adding: *"[The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's] activities should contribute to the implementation of Agenda 2030 and global environmental agreements, such as the Paris Agreement."* The submission outlines that the country's definition of the Paris alignment of its development cooperation is based on the conceptual framework presented in the OECD report, Aligning Development Co-operation and Climate Action: The Only Way Forward.

Canada

8

Canada's second biennial communication provides some quantitative and qualitative information to improve the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries and shows significant improvements in comparison to the country's first biennial communication. The submission provides enhanced quantitative information to outline that its future climate finance will increase, while referring primarily to examples of multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions as evidence. The communication commits to the Glasgow Climate Pact to double adaptation finance by 2025 yet provides no clear commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance in the future. Concerning gender-responsiveness the Canadian submission states that initiatives are strongly aligned to Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, and that 80% of its climate finance target will consider gender equality. The information provided also offers a definition of additionality, yet Canada remains a distance away from providing 0.7% of its GNI as ODA.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 1 B. 1	Canada's second biennial communication includes some quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of public climate finance to be provided in the future. The submission references Canada's commitment to provide 5.3 billion CAD from 2021-2025 (approximately 4 billion USD). The target represents a doubling of climate finance, relative to the amounts provided between 2016-2021. The submission does not outline how, or whether, Canada will provide its fair share of the collective climate finance target. The submission does provide some information regarding the programmes, projects, and multilateral organisations to receive some of the funding, but the information falls short of offering a holistic picture of future projected climate finance provisions, particularly regarding recipient countries. The information therefore only partially enhances the predictability of future climate finance. Canada does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 0	The submission states that: *"Canada's $5.3 billion commitment is bolstering support for adaptation action by increasing the provision of funding towards adaptation to a minimum of 40%"*, adding that this support will adhere to the Glasgow Climate Pact to double adaptation finance by 2025. However, there is no reference to "balance" in the submission, nor to the historic imbalance in climate finance and a need to address it. Canada's commitment to provide a minimum of 40% of its finance in support of adaptation will not ensure that balanced finances are provided moving forward. Reporting in Canada's Fifth Biennial Report shows that previous provisions have not achieved balance, with 10%, 63% and 28% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission recognises that grant-based support is most suitable for adaptation activities.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Canada's submission states: *"Canada recognizes the threats climate change poses for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and is committed to supporting their mitigation and adaptation efforts. As such, Canada's financial support aims at addressing the needs and priorities of developing countries in line with their national objectives."* The submission then outlines examples of its support which address the most vulnerable, including support to the National Adaptation Plan Global Network. Because the submission does not provide detail on the recipient countries it will fund, or a holistic picture of how its future finance will be distributed, limited information has been provided to outline how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of Canada's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 19% and 6%, just below and well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). On grant-based support, Canada's biennial communication recognises the need for grants for adaptation purposes. Yet of the bilateral climate finance reported in Canada's Fifth Biennial Report, only around 34% was provided using grants. Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states: *"80% of projects under the $5.3 billion commitment will include gender equality considerations, in line with Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy".*
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 1	Canada's submission includes a definition of new and additional finance, stating: *"Canada provides projected levels of public finance based on multi-year commitments of new and additional climate finance support. These commitments are new and additional climate finance as they are above and beyond what was planned prior to the Copenhagen Accord. Additionally, Canada's $5.3 billion climate finance commitment requires all projects to have a "principal" climate change objective, as per the guidelines of the OECD Rio Climate Markers. Canada will continue to mainstream climate change into other international assistance."* The submission adds: *"Projects with "significant" climate change objectives are counted as other international assistance with a climate change component under Canada's reporting of climate finance to the UNFCCC, and these are additional to the $5.3 billion commitment."* Canada's definition of additionality does, to some extent, ensure additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Because climate finance with "significant" climate objectives are not included under its target, the definition does include safeguards to partially protect increases in climate finance displacing development finance. From 2011-2018, Canada provided 85% of its climate support above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none of its finance was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA. Canada provided 0.32% of its GNI as ODA in 2021, while analysis indicates that the government's Budget 2023 cut the development finance budget by 15% (OECD, 2023a; Cooperation Canada, 2023).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Canada provides some information on how certain channels will act to mobilise private climate finance in the future, including from FinDev and Export Development Canada. The submission provides case studies of these channels' efforts to do so in the past alongside their future mobilisation targets. The submission does not provide information across all channels regarding efforts to engage the private sector. Concerning aligning financial flows with low-emissions development and climate resilience, Canada recognises the importance of Article 2.1.c. of the Paris Agreement and acknowledges efforts to date have fallen short. The submission then includes examples of how Canada is working with Paris Alignment, including as a shareholder in the MDBs.

Belgium

8

Belgium's second biennial communication provides some enhanced quantitative information to improve the predictability of its future provisions of climate finance. The submission provides information outlining the characteristics of the climate finance already provided to developing country Parties, and information regarding multi-year commitments to multilateral institutions. As a result, Belgium has only partially increased the clarity and predictability surrounding its future support for developing countries, while evidencing that scaled-up finances will be extended. Little detail has been provided to highlight the projects, programmes, and recipient countries which will be financed. The biennial communication does state support for a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance, and for focused support for the most vulnerable, further highlighting Belgium's history of doing so in the past through grants. Belgium provides no information to outline how its climate finance, past or present, is gender responsive.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 1 B. 1	Belgium provides some qualitative and quantitative information to outline its future provision of climate finance, stating: *"Belgium provided on average EUR 90,9 million/year in the period 2013-2020. From 2022 onwards, the indicative planned provisions show that this will increase to at least EUR 135 million/year"*. The indicative, enhanced information therefore represents an increase in climate finance moving forward, yet makes no reference to how, or whether, Belgium's fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal will be met. Most of the quantitative information provided in Belgium's second biennial communication refers to data and shares already committed or disbursed, such as multiyear commitments to multilateral funds, and data describing trends from previous years (2013-2020). Some qualitative information regarding specific recipient countries, programmes, and multilateral organisations to be funded have been provided with reference to Belgium's National Energy and Climate Plan, however this information is not comprehensive. Concerning geographical targets, the submission states that previous trends are the foundation of future provisions, with past targets focused on Africa, LDCs, adaptation (and cross-cutting activities) and grant-based support.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 1 B. 2	The Belgian biennial communication provides no indicative quantitative information concerning the balance of climate objectives within its future provisions, yet states: *"Belgium strongly supports a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provision of financial support at the international level" and that "Our priority remains support for adaptation, in LDCs and in Africa"*. The submission does not explicitly note the current imbalance in international climate finance and the need to redress that imbalance, noting its support is mainly demand driven and therefore for adaptation activities. The submission does evidence strong past commitments to grant-based support (90% of finance from 2013-2020, a slight decrease in comparison to a grant-share of 96% from 2013-2019) and refers to evidence of a large adaptation focus in prior reporting (46% of total finance from 2013-2020, with 43% for cross-cutting activities). Belgium has stated that it will keep prioritising adaptation action in the future (Government of Canada, 2022). Reporting in Belgium's Fifth Biennial Report shows that previous provisions have prioritised adaptation, with 50%, 39% and 11% of its climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023).
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 0 B. 1	There is a lack of detail and clarity on the specific recipients, projects, and programmes which will be used to extend the majority of future Belgian support. The degree to which vulnerability will be targeted in future provisions through all channels is therefore difficult to determine, despite Belgium's track record of providing large shares of its support to LDCs. Information provided highlights that over 50% of past Belgian finance can be seen to be channelled bilaterally. Of this bilateral finance, the majority is provided to the African continent, and over 50% is provided to LDCs. The submission states that contributions to Africa and LDCs will remain a priority. The submission also contains specific reference to harmonising climate projects with the national policy within the recipient country. Concerning future climate finance, broader qualitative statements are made highlighting that Belgium *"envisages the continuation and scaling-up of budget lines for climate action and strengthening of climate policies in our partner countries."* The LDC and SIDS shares of Belgium's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 32% and 1.8%, well above and below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). There is little evidence to indicate the gender-responsiveness of any future support.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 0	Belgium describes all of its financial support as new and additional, as it comprises: *"Provisions in line with Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention; Contributions which would not have existed without the financial commitments, stemming from the Copenhagen Accord; Budget lines on top of the annual budget for bilateral development cooperation; Only the climate-specific or climate-relevant part of projects and programmes; Only climate-related projects in developing countries additional to the previous reporting period; Contributions from the revenues obtained from auctioning greenhouse gas emission allowances."* Therefore, the submission conceptualises additionality in various ways when describing various portions of Belgium's climate finance. From 2011-2018, Belgium provided just 6% of its climate support above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none of its climate finance was in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Belgium provided 0.43% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 0 B. 1	Belgium's submission acknowledges the importance of public, grant-based support, and it states a two-fold approach for future plans to mobilise additional finance from a wide variety of sources: *"Private climate finance will be further mobilised by using a two-fold approach: Providing support that directly mobilises private climate finance for mitigation and adaptation measures; Supporting partner countries in designing, implementing and financing enabling environments for private investment in mitigation and adaptation measures, creating capacities that will enable institutions to develop financial products and build a portfolio over the long term. This will result in indirectly mobilising additional private investments in developing countries."* However, indicative quantitative information regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Belgium is lacking. The submission states that the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries will invest a minimum of 150 million EUR in 2023. There is limited information concerning the countries in which the activities will take place, or the programmes and projects which will be funded. Regarding how Belgian support will help make financial flows consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, the submission simply states its support *"aims at assisting them in meeting the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement."*

Australia

7

Australia has provided some indicative quantitative information in their submission to better outline their future contributions of climate finance up to 2025. The second biennial communication provides clear examples of the projects, programmes, and regions to be funded, yet specific detail regarding recipient countries is lacking, as is a multi-annual outlook of projected climate finance. The lack of these details limits the clarity and predictability the submission provides for finance recipients. The five-year 2 billion AUD commitment from 2020/21-2024/25 represents a progression beyond previous efforts when compared to the support provided over the previous five years. While the submission does commit to continued balance between mitigation and adaptation support, it provides no quantitative or qualitative information to show where and how it will be delivered. In addition, Australia's climate finances (including in its Fifth Biennial Report) have been primarily reported as cross-cutting in nature, meaning enhanced clarity is needed to accurately determine the amount it will provide towards adaptation and mitigation objectives in the future. Australia has not provided a definition of "new and additional" climate finance, meaning that the predictability of future Australian support is further limited. Regarding transparency under the Paris Agreement, failing to outline a definition prevents clarity surrounding whether increases in climate finance will displace ODA.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 1 B. 1	Australia has provided some quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of public finance it plans to provide for climate action in developing countries over five years from 2020/21 to 2024/25: *"The most recent climate finance commitment made by an Australian Government undertook to provide $2 billion over the period... Australia is on track to meet this commitment."* This represents increased ambition in comparison to the previous submission. The biennial communication does not provide multi-year budgets for this pledge. Australia has added information in comparison to its first biennial communication by indicating its priority regions (Pacific, SE Asia) and sectors (DRR, WASH, NBS) to be funded. The submission provides several examples for each of these, all of which contain multi-annual commitments to initiatives, some up to the year 2027. Despite the examples of multi-annual commitments outlined in the submission, indicative annual amounts to be provided to these initiatives over the coming years to 2025 is lacking. While detail on regional initiatives is forthcoming, no explicit reference is made to priority recipient countries. Australia does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	The second biennial communication states: *"Australia acknowledges the need to improve the balance between mitigation and adaptation and recognises the importance of adaptation financing, including for our region. Around 70% of Australia's bilateral and regional assistance has focused on adaptation and resilience, reflecting the needs of our region."* The submission goes on to say, *"this will continue to be a strong focus for Australia"*. However, Australia's ex-post climate finance reporting overwhelmingly reports finance as cross-cutting in nature, without further breakdown between mitigation and adaptation objectives. This makes it difficult to determine accurate adaptation shares in Australian support and reduces the clarity of statements concerning the continuation of past trends in future support. Across 2019-2020, Australia provided 35%, 57% and 8% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Furthermore, the submission refers to balance only with regards to bilateral and regional support, with no evidence provided to indicate that finance through other channels will sufficiently target adaptation, or that at least 50% of Australia's overall provision will target adaptation. On grant-based support, the submission states: *"Australia's climate finance has been almost exclusively grant-based to date, and grant finance will remain fundamental to our climate finance for the 2020–2025 period."*
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Australia's biennial communication outlines the country's approach to development work and foreign policy and the integration of First Nations voices within that. On developing country-led strategies, the submission states: *"Australia's focus is on providing climate finance to our partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and we will continue to listen to and be guided by the priorities and strategies of partner national governments and local communities."* The submission implies that support will respond to the increased climate vulnerabilities felt by Pacific Island nations, though it has not been as explicit about this as in its first biennial communication. Despite this, several examples are provided of the types of support available to the region from Australia's climate finance. Australia is explicit about the gendered impacts of climate change, *"risks are most acute for women and girls facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and inequality, including Indigenous women and girls. Australia will continue to ensure our climate finance is socially and gender inclusive and equitable."* However, the submission does not refer to support to LDCs, and does not indicate that Australia intends to address the needs of the most vulnerable as a priority. The LDC and SIDS shares of Australia's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 17% and 42%, below and well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 0 B. 1	Australia's biennial communication does not mention additionality in any capacity. The previous submission indicated that Australia considered all its finance to be new and additional if it has not been included in prior reporting. This definition did not ensure that the country's climate finance would be new and additional to its support for development, and was not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. In the absence of any other definition given in this submission, it is assumed Australia's position remains as laid out in its first biennial communication. Australia has historically provided its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009 yet has not provided any funding in excess of 0.7% of GNI (CARE, 2022). Australia provided 0.22% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning plans to mobilise private climate finance in the future, the Australian submission notes that, *"We are increasingly using innovative financing mechanisms to attract more private investment for effective climate action."* Both Blended Finance and Mobilized Private Finance are noted as channels of delivery for climate assistance. While examples of some initiatives used to mobilise private finance are outlined, including the Australian Climate Finance Partnership, the submission does not provide a clear and holistic plan for mobilising support in the future. Less information is included to provide indicative, quantitative estimates regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Australia in the coming years. The submission *"acknowledges the importance of Article 2.1c of the Paris agreement" and establishes Australia's aim to "mainstream climate in all bilateral and regional development programming."*

Germany

7

Germany's second biennial communication provides some enhanced qualitative and quantitative information to better ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission outlines an enhanced quantitative climate finance target of 6 billion EUR to be provided annually by 2025 through budgetary sources yet provides little further information regarding how the future finances will be apportioned and distributed. By stating a continued aim to provide parity between mitigation and adaptation finance, while having failed to do so in previous support, the communication provides little clarity regarding a balanced allocation of resources for adaptation and mitigation objectives. The submission states that engagements with LDCs and SIDS will continue to be a high priority to the German government but does not provide detailed and enhanced information regarding future support to such recipients. Finally, the submission does not define "new and additional" climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Germany is one of the largest global providers of both ODA and climate finance, and one of the few countries to surpass the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA. A lack of clarity regarding additionality could severely impact the predictability of both climate and development support in developing countries.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 1 B. 1	Germany's biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance, instead outlining that climate finance from budgetary sources will rise to 6 billion EUR by 2025. Germany provided just over 5 billion EUR of climate finance from budgetary sources in 2020, this level of support formally constituted an over-achievement of the country's goal, first stated in 2014, to provide 4 billion EUR by 2020. The submission does not provide evidence showing how Germany has estimated its fair share of international climate finance, yet states that it will do so. Additional information within the submission cites multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF and the GEF, and to initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnerships, as indicative of future German support. Information on projected climate finance does not provide a holistic picture of future levels of support and does not include detailed information outlining bilateral projects and programmes to be funded. The submission states: *"To ensure transparency towards recipient countries, Germany publishes its lists of partner countries on a regular basis"* and that *"Geographically, Africa will continue to be Germany's regional priority for development cooperation"*.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 1 B. 0	Regarding balanced provisions of climate finance, the submission states: *"Germany strives for a balanced allocation of resources for climate finance to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. The German government has kept its climate finance from budgetary sources close to parity throughout the past years and will continue to do its best in order to maintain this balance."* Parity is referred to explicitly in reference to climate finance from budgetary sources, while the balance of resources to be extended from other sources tends to target mitigation objectives more prominently. Reporting in Germany's Fifth Biennial Report shows that previous provisions have not achieved balance, with 18%, 23% and 55% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Outside of budgetary sources, 13% and 12% of Germany's climate finance targeted adaptation in 2019 and 2020. The submission adds that Germany is committed: *"to increase its focus on adaptation activities to contribute its share to the collective goal of doubling adaptation finance by 2025 from 2019 levels"*. However, in the context of increasing overall climate support, such a commitment does not ensure balance in aggregate future provisions. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 0	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: *"The German government follows a partner country demand-driven approach in the allocation of bilateral climate finance. In each partner country, cooperation areas are defined in a dialogue on equal terms"*, adding: *"Germany is also a founding member and major donor of the NDC [Nationally Determined Contributions] Partnership... A country-driven approach is at the core of the NDC Partnership's work."* On supporting the most vulnerable, the biennial communication outlines that *"Germany will continue to provide targeted support to the most vulnerable countries in the group of LDCs and SIDS"*. The submission provides qualitative information and ex-post examples of support provided to the LDCF, NDC Partnership, and the Task Force on Access to Finance as evidence of its past support to the most vulnerable. However, no detailed, quantitative information is provided to outline further sources of support to the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of Germany's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 11% and 0.2%, both well below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). On grant-based support, the submission states that the majority of its support to LDCs and SIDS has been grant-based, and that Germany aims to continue to do so in the future. Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states that Germany's feminist development and foreign policy, grounded in the 2021 Coalition Agreement, *"has placed gender equality at the centre of political action"*. Further noting that a review of the Gender Action Plan will aim to ensure an increase in Germany's gender-responsive development portfolio: *"Gender-responsive design of climate policy and the implementation of gender responsive adaptation and mitigation strategies is a priority."*
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning additionality, the biennial communication states: *"New and additional climate finance means that all funds are newly pledged or disbursed in the reporting year and have not been reported in previous years as climate finance."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. Despite this, Germany has increased the amounts of ODA it provides annually, reaching 0.76% of GNI in 2021 (OECD, 2023a). As a result, a portion of Germany's climate finance in 2021 can be considered additional to the UN 0.7% target. From 2011-2018, Germany provided 82% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, yet none of its climate finance between those years was in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning plans to mobilise private-sector finances for climate action, the submission states: *"Climate finance will continue to be mobilised using a twofold approach: Firstly, by directly mobilising private climate finance for mitigation and adaptation measures, for example through public co-financing or guarantees (in accordance with established budgetary procedures and national regulations). Secondly, by supporting partner countries in designing, implementing and financing enabling environments for private investment in mitigation and adaptation measures."* The information provided does not include indicative quantitative information regarding mobilised private finance, despite Germany being one of the few developed country Parties to provide ex-post quantitative information on the private climate finance it mobilises annually. The biennial communication provides details on how both Germany's climate finance and its broader work with regulatory frameworks and fiscal policies are consistent with low-emissions and resilient development, adding: *"Germany has been a strong advocate of aligning public finance institutions with the goals of the Paris Agreement."*

The Netherlands

7

The Netherlands' second biennial communication provides some enhanced quantitative information to outline its future provisions of climate finance. The submission outlines the Netherlands' commitment to increase its climate finance from both public and private sources from 1.25 billion EUR in 2021 to 1.80 billion EUR in 2025. 50%, or 900 million EUR, of the new target will continue to be sourced as moblised private finance. While the submission does outline various multi-annual contributions to multilateral organisations, it does not provide a comprehensive multi-annual breakdown of the country's overarching climate finance target, including future provisions to be provided through all channels up to 2025. Beyond noting that public finance has in the past been almost entirely grant based, and that the Netherland's will cooperate across 22 focus countries, further information which enhances the clarity and predictability of projects and programmes to be funded is not forthcoming. As a result, the submission has not significantly increased the clarity and predictability of its future support for developing country Parties. The biennial communication contains no information on the adaptation and mitigation shares of its target, though the Netherlands states an aim to provide more public finance towards adaptation than mitigation in the future. The submission acknowledges most mobilised private climate finance it provided towards mitigation, leading to a commitment to prioritise engagements with the private sector to promote adaptation objectives. The Netherlands does not provide a clear and meaningful definition of "new and additional" climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 1 B. 1	The Netherlands provides some qualitative and quantitative information on its projected levels of support for climate action in developing countries. The Netherlands has *"committed to a significant increase in climate finance (private and public) from EUR 1.25 billion in 2021 to EUR 1.80 billion in 2025"*. This commitment is not further broken down into annual allocations, though it is stated that *"public climate finance is almost completely in the form of grants."* Regarding programming, the Netherlands provides examples of commitments to various multilateral institutions, many of which extend for long periods into the future. For example, 160 million EUR to the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development (DFCD) for the period 2019-2038. The report does not break down exact figures into different channels of delivery, nor does it specify which countries it plans to work in beyond stating: *"we will channel our bilateral support to poverty reduction and increased resilience in 22 countries in West-Africa/Sahel, Northern-Africa, Middle East and the Horn of Africa."* The submission states that *"Focus sectors are renewable energy, forestry, agriculture, water management and WASH."* The Netherlands refers to two documents that will guide its climate financing in the near future, the Trade and Development Policy, Doing What the Netherlands is Good At, and the country's International Climate Strategy. The Netherlands does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning the balanced support stipulated in the Paris Agreement, the Netherland's submission states: *"The Netherlands aims to provide more than half of its public climate finance to adaptation."* This highlights that adaptation will be prioritised in the country's public support moving forward. Reporting in the Netherland's Fifth Biennial Report shows that 32%, 59% and 9% of the country's climate finance was reported as in support of adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). While the Netherlands has consistently provided more public adaptation finance than public mitigation finance, the majority of the Netherland's public climate support has been reported as cross-cutting finance in previous years. The detailed objective breakdown of such finance remains unknown. There is no indicative quantitative information to outline the balance between climate objectives within the Netherland's overall 1.8 billion EUR target. Regarding mobilised private climate finance specifically, the biennial communication acknowledges the imbalance in global flows of mobilised private support, adding: *"The Netherlands has decided to focus explicitly on mobilising the private sector for adaptation."* Oxfam assessed that in 2021, roughly 80% and 20% of the Netherlands' mobilised private finance targeted mitigation and adaptation objectives, respectively, meaning that the adaptation share of overall Dutch climate finance will likely remain below 50% under the present target without further action (Oxfam, 2021). The submission notes the thematic areas to be focussed on within adaptation objectives, namely climate-smart agriculture, climate-resilient infrastructure, integrated water resource management, the provision of climate-resilient water, sanitation and hygiene services (WaSH). The Netherlands outlines that the public component of its future finance will be primarily grant-based.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	The Netherlands' submission notes that of their public climate finance, *"more than half of it will be spent on climate change adaptation with a focus on the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world."* The submission notes the *"strong focus on poverty"*, specifying that the poorest are often the most affected by climate change. The submission also outlines example of the Netherlands supporting specific initiatives that focus on issues of climate justice, including, Amplifying Voices for Just Climate Action (VCA), Global Alliance for Green and Gender Action (GAGGA), African Activists for Climate Justice (AACJ) and the Green Livelihoods Alliance. The integration of gender equality in the Netherlands' climate finance is noted as *"an important cross-cutting issue"*, though does not go into how it plans to address gendered impacts of climate change. Regarding the large portion of mobilized private finance included in the Netherlands' target (50% of the total), there is no indicated focus on the most vulnerable countries and/or communities. More generally, there is no explicit reference to vulnerability in the Netherlands' biennial communication, and it does not show how, or to what degree, finance will be extended towards specific countries. The LDC share of the Netherland's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 was 17%, below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). The country reported no climate-related development finance as in support of SIDS across the same years (ibid.).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 0 B. 0	The submission states that the Netherlands considers all its climate finance to be new and additional as it has not been reported in previous years: *"As our budget is approved by Parliament annually, providing new and additional resources to the budgets approved in previous years, all the financial support to developing countries for climate action provided from this budget in a given year is considered new and additional."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, the Netherlands provided none of its climate support above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, and just 22% was in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). The Netherlands provided 0.52% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 0	Despite strong evidence of comprehensive engagement with the private sector through the multilateral development banks (MDBs), the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, and other channels, the information provided in the submission fails to present a detailed plan to enable future mobilisation of private climate finance. Concerning finance aligned with low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: *"The Netherlands' ambition is to 'green' the instruments for foreign trade and development cooperation."* This does not represent a significant improvement on the previous Biennial Communication.

Norway

7

Norway's second biennial communication provides some indicative information to outline its future climate finance, but it does not provide indicative annual totals within the submission. Instead, the biennial communication presents a selection of multiannual commitments and programmes as examples of its future support and remains far from providing a holistic picture of the support that it intends to provide to developing countries in the coming years. While a new scaled up financial target is provided up to 2026, there is a lack of enhanced ambition regarding adaptation financing, with no recognition of the importance of striving for balance. The overwhelming majority of Norway's past climate finance has targeted mitigation objectives, and the submission does not suggest this will change in a meaningful way in future. The biennial communication does not provide substantive clarity or detail concerning support for the most vulnerable, including women and girls. Information has been provided to indicate that Norway's climate finance provision will continue to be in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA, and therefore can be considered as "new and additional".

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Norway provides some qualitative and quantitative information on the projected levels of public financial resources that it expects to provide for climate action in developing countries. The headline commitment outlined in the submission is to *"double our total annual climate finance to NOK (Norwegian Krone) 14 billion by 2026 compared to NOK 7 billion in 2020, and as part of this to at least triple our adaptation finance"*. This is an improvement in the level of quantitative information provided compared to Norway's first biennial communication. However, the information falls short of providing indicative totals of climate finances to be extended in specific years, or to which recipient countries. It instead mainly focuses on the finance to be extended through a selection of programmes and organisations, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and The Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). Regarding recipient countries, the submission states that Norwegian ODA is extended to 17 partner countries, yet the climate finance extended to each varies significantly. Colombia, Ethiopia, and Indonesia are said to receive comparatively large volumes of climate-related ODA due to their relevance for NICFI, yet further detail is lacking. The information provided in Norway's submission is therefore improved but remains below the level required to significantly enhance predictability for recipient country nations. Norway does not provide information on how, or whether, it will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	In Norway's climate finance reporting to the UN in biennial reports, the vast majority of climate finance is reported as mitigation finance. Norway's biennial communication acknowledges this by noting the 11% of its climate finance targeted adaptation in 2021. Reporting in Norway's Fifth Biennial Report, covering 2019 and 2020, shows that earlier provisions have not achieved balance, with 8%, 7%, 59%, and 26% of its climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting, mitigation and "other" objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). While Norway's has a stated goal to triple its adaptation finance by 2026, this does not correspond to balanced support for mitigation and adaptation objectives. If the level of adaptation finance provided by Norway in 2020 was tripled, the resulting adaptation share would equate to approximately 17% of the new 14 billion NOK target. Norway's submission states that reported climate finance figures: *"conceal the positive effect on climate adaptation and resilience of reduced deforestation and forest degradation"*, and that much of its mitigation (particularly forestry) finance is reported purely as mitigation relevant despite this. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, Norway's submission states: *"The overall objective of Norwegian ODA is to fight poverty, save lives and alleviate suffering. Gender, human rights, anti-corruption and climate and environment are cross cutting issues that have to be taken into account in all Norwegian ODA. Women and girls, youth, minority groups and indigenous and local communities are given priority."* On targeting vulnerability, as mentioned above, the reported adaptation share of Norway's climate finance is low. The LDC and SIDS shares of Norway's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 12% and 0.3%, both well below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). No quantitative information has been provided showing how and to what degree future climate finance will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable, such as the LDCs and SIDS. The submission states: *"Gender, human rights, anti-corruption and climate and environment are cross cutting issues that have to be taken into account in all Norwegian ODA"* yet provides no further detail regarding gender-responsive finance in its future climate support, or quantitative evidence of its integration.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Norway does not define new and additional climate finance in its submission and makes no reference to additionality in this context. The submission states that: *"The Government will continue to increase aid in the coming years with a target to use 1 % of GNI for international efforts to achieve the SDGs"*, while also acknowledging that recent GNI growth means that the target has been missed in recent years. The information provided states that Norway's ODA budget has been steadily increasing alongside the ODA budget for adaptation and mitigation support. This information does suggest, implicitly, that climate finance could be considered as new and additional to the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA. From 2011-2018, Norway provided 70% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, and 94% was in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Norway provided 0.93% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning the mobilisation of private finance, Norway highlights a selection of its activities which interact with the private sector, with some indication of how further resources will be mobilised in the future. The biennial communication outlines that Norfund remains as the *"key private-sector investment instrument of Norway's development policy."* The submission further outlines how Norwegian support promotes low-emissions development abroad. Information is provided indicating that Norway supports market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, such as the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility, to which Norway has committed 80 million USD.

The European Commission

7

The second biennial communication from the European Commission (EC) provides some quantitative and qualitative information outlining scaled-up future climate finance provisions for the European Union's 2021-2027 budgetary period. In addition, the submission does broadly outline how the finances will be apportioned at the programme level, but it provides less consistent clarity on recipient countries to be funded. Compared to the information outlining the future support to be provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the submission provides more clarity regarding the future climate finance to be channelled through the development finance instrument of the EC's budget. Information regarding the EIB's future support remains far from ensuring clarity or predictability with regards to future amounts, issues of balance, the targeting of vulnerability, and efforts to provide grant-based and concessional finance. Despite this, information provided concerning the EC's future support states that balanced finance will be provided to both adaptation and mitigation objectives primarily through grants, with a focus on the most vulnerable. Both the EC's second biennial communication submission and the shared chapter presenting common information for all Member States and the EU institutions provide limited information regarding the gender-responsiveness of their planned support. Lastly, the EC states that it considers all its finance to be "new and additional" as it has not been previously reported. The definition does not meaningfully ensure additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC and presents no safeguards to ensure that increases in climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	The EC's second biennial communication provides detailed qualitative and quantitative information to outline projected levels of climate finance to be channelled through the EC's development finance instrument between 2021-2017. Regarding the EC's Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the submission states: *"The total EU external action has been allocated with EUR 110 597 million... 30 % of which or approximately EUR 33 180 million will be dedicated to climate related activities"*. Quantitative, clear and indicative information regarding the EIB's future provisions of climate finance to developing countries is lacking, with the submission focusing on the Bank's past efforts. Information regarding specific recipients and projects to be funded by both the EC and EIB is lacking within the submission, with only regionality and broader programming details provided. Despite this, partner countries are outlined as part of the NDICI with regards to the EC's overall development support. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, the EU institutions will ensure they provide their fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning balance, information in the biennial communication concerning the EC's climate finance states: *"The latest available figures for the period 2014-19 indicate a balance between the amounts allocated to mitigation and adaptation actions,"* and that "the EU aims to maintain such an approach during the next programming period 2021-27." On the EIB's support, the submission adds that the Bank identified the need to scale-up support for adaptation and: *"has an additional target for climate change adaptation, pledging to increase the share of adaptation support to 15 % of the bank's overall finance for climate action by 2025."* The submission does recognise the need to scale-up adaptation finance but does not outline plans to redress the current imbalance within global climate finance. While all the EC's adaptation support is grant-based, the vast majority of the EIB's adaptation finance is provided as loans. Reporting in the EU's Fifth Biennial Report shows that the EC and European Development Fund (EDF) have previously achieved balance, providing 52%, 29% and 19% of their climate finance towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The EIB's climate finance remains imbalanced, with 17% and 83% targeting adaptation and mitigation, respectively, in 2019 and 2020.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning the EC's support of developing country-driven strategies, the submission states programming for the 2021-2027 period: *"provides a specific, tailor-made framework for cooperation and is mainly built on a national or regional strategies, including the Nationally Determined Contributions to the Paris Agreement."* On the EIB's support, the submission states: *"the MDBs are working and collaborating to enhance support to countries for the formulation of robust and ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Long-term Strategies (LTSs), and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in line with the Paris Agreement goal"*. While reference is made to both LDCs and SIDS by both the EC and EIB, there is a lack of detail concerning the specific vulnerable countries to receive support in the future, particularly regarding the EIB's support. The LDC and SIDS shares of the EC and EDF's climate-related development finance across 2019-2020 were 18% and 4%, below and above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). The EIB provided 6% and 1% of its climate-related development finance to LDCs and SIDS, respectively (ibid.). On gender-responsiveness, the submission states: *"The EIB's Gender Action Plan 2021-2024 further aims at supporting an integrated, gender-responsive approach to climate vulnerability as well as building resilience in fragile and conflict affected areas"*. There is no detailed reference to the EC's position or actions with regard to gender-responsiveness, despite this the EU Gender Action Plan III including a pillar linking climate and gender equality, and the NDICI commitment to ensure gender is mainstreamed in 85% of all new EU ODA funded programmes (European Commission, 2020).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	The EC's submission states: *"'New and additional resources' are considered to be resources committed after and not included in the previous National Communications or Biennial Reports."* As a result, the EC considers all its climate finance to be new and additional. This definition does not ensure that the EC's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC.
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Information provided in the biennial communication states that the NDICI and Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance contain *"an investment framework for external action to raise additional financial resources for sustainable development from the private sector."* The submission outlines a range of instruments which could be utilised by the EU to leverage private investments, stating: *"Together with the private sector and thanks to the leverage effect, this may mobilize more than half a trillion euros in investments for the period 2021-2027"*. On the EIB's role in mobilising private finance the submission adds: *"In 2020, EIB contributed around USD 1.8 bn in direct mobilisation, and USD 13.4 bn in indirect mobilisation, making it one of the largest contributors to co-financing"*. Regarding providing finance in adherence to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, the submission focuses on both the EC and EIB's involvement in the Global Green Bond Initiative to help partner countries mobilise capital from institutional investors to finance climate and environment projects. Additional detail is lacking in the submission to highlight how the EC and EIB will help developing countries ensure all finance flows are consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience.

United States

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The second biennial communication submitted by the United States (US) provides some qualitative and quantitative information to better ensure the predictability of the country's future climate finance for developing countries. The submission reiterates its target to provide 11.4 billion USD of climate finance annually by 2024 yet provides little further information regarding how its future finances will be apportioned and distributed. The submission contains a weak commitment in support of balanced finance for adaptation and mitigation objectives yet has only committed to provide 3 billion USD in adaptation finance by 2024 and currently provides just 18% of its climate finance towards adaptation. Despite the submission providing some examples of how it will support the most vulnerable countries through its multilateral cooperation, the biennial communication does not offer detailed information to outline the amounts of finance the US intends to provide to LDCs and SIDS in the future. In addition, the submission contains very limited information regarding gender-responsive support and does not recognise the need for scaled-up grant-based support for adaptation. Finally, the US submission fails to define how it considers its support to be "new and additional".

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	The US' biennial communication outlines that the country's climate finance will rise to 11.4 billion USD per year by 2024. According to the US' Fifth Biennial Report, the country provided just over 1.7 billion USD of climate finance on average from 2019-2020. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, the US will ensure they provide their fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal. The submission does provide some examples of its commitments to selected multilateral organisations over the coming years, yet provides limited information regarding the recipient countries, projects, and programmes it will fund in the future under its target. While the submission references USAID's Climate Strategy 2022-2030 to outline information regarding broader financial instrument and channel usage, the details provided on projected climate finance do not provide a holistic picture of future levels of support.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Regarding balanced provisions of climate finance, the submission states: *"The United States remains committed to the aim of achieving a balance in the provision of scaled-up financial resources between mitigation and adaptation"*, citing the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) as a tool to achieve this aim while recognising the current imbalance in collective adaptation finance provisions. Despite this, the US commitment to provide 3 billion USD of adaptation finance by 2024 shows, explicitly, that balance will not be ensured in its future support. No reference is made regarding the specific need for grant-based support for adaptation activities within the submission. Reporting in the US' Fifth Biennial Report shows that its previous support has been far from balanced, with 14%, 7% and 78% of its climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023).
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: *"In coordination with all relevant U.S. Government departments and agencies, the United States will engage with foreign counterparts on their climate priorities"*. On supporting the most vulnerable, the biennial communication outlines that *"the United States will ensure that our instruments and approaches continue to be fit-for-purpose for the specific geography and context in which they are deployed, including by prioritizing the most concessional resources where they are needed most, such as in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)"*. The submission provides some examples of its support targeting the most vulnerable, such as finance to and through the Adaptation Fund, LDCF, and Millenium Challenge Corporation, and highlights finance access as an issue. Despite this, no detailed, quantitative, and enhanced information is provided regarding its future support to the most vulnerable, including specific recipients. The LDC and SIDS shares of the United States' climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 16% and 1.6%, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). The submission provides very limited information regarding gender-responsive support, mentioning only that the United States will *"Increase the amount and quality of finance that accelerates climate adaptation and resilience and supports gender-responsive, locally-led adaptation"*, while providing no further detail.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Concerning additionality, the communication states: *"the Executive Branch of the United States government works with the U.S. Congress to appropriate new and additional funding on an annual basis."* The submission does not provide a definition of additionality, nor information evidencing that its future support will be new and additional in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, the United States provided 87% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). The United States provided 0.2% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning plans to mobilise private-sector finances for climate action, the submission recognises that efforts to date have not mobilised enough resources. The submissions then outlines numerous initiatives to build strong investable project pipelines, including through the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Export Bank of the United States (EXIM), the Departments of the Treasury and State, and US Agency for International Development (USAID). The submission then briefly outlines the desire to explore how the MDBs can deploy their balance sheets more efficiently. The information provided does not include indicative quantitative information regarding future mobilisations of private finances. Concerning making financial flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilient development, the biennial communication references the scaling back of public investments in fossil fuels and the work of the Treasury Department and other agencies in: *"(1) improving information on climate-related risks and opportunities; (2) identifying climate-aligned investments; (3) managing climate-related financial risks; and (4) aligning portfolios and strategies with climate objectives."*

France

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France's second biennial communication provides some qualitative and quantitative information to better ensure the predictability of the country's future climate finance for developing countries , yet the submission did not commit to scale-up France's support. Announced at the Climate Ambition Summit 2020, France's annual pledge to commit 6 billion EUR of climate finance annually post-2020 is a 20% increase as compared to its previous pledge for 2020 and effectively maintains the level of climate finance provided by the Party in 2019. Concerning the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be financed in the future, detail is lacking. Because France has committed to provide only a third of its future climate finance towards adaptation, the submission outlines that the country's climate finance will remain imbalanced in the future. In addition, France does not have a track record of providing balanced, predominantly grant-based, climate finance in the past. Through its Solidarity and Development Law, France has committed to support a gender equality and rights-based approach through its climate support. However, the extent to which the most vulnerable will be targeted through France's future support is unclear, with little quantitative information provided regarding future support for LDCs and SIDS. The submission does not provide information outlining that France's climate finance will be "new and additional" to the country's support for development. France's definition of "new and additional" climate finance is not in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Information provided in France's biennial communication provides some quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance in the future. The submission states that France will provide *"€6 billion of climate finance every year between 2021 and 2025"*. France reported 5.96 and 5.08 billion EUR of climate finance to the UNFCCC in 2019 and 2020, respectively, mostly through loans. The submission provides information on multiannual commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and to individual channels such as the French Development Agency (AFD). The submission provides little information regarding recipient countries and programmes to be funded, yet states that the Solidarity and Development Law sets targets with regards to ODA provisions for the most vulnerable countries and priority sector. France's submission has provided limited enhanced quantitative and qualitative information to ensure the enhanced predictability of its future climate finance for developing country Parties. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, France will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	The submission provides no assurance that France's support will ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance. The information provided states that a third of France's climate finance will target adaptation, with France committing to provide 2 billion EUR annually towards adaptation objectives from 2021-2025. This demonstrates that France's provisions will remain imbalanced and will not help to redress the global imbalance in international climate finance. Reporting in France's Fifth Biennial Report shows that its previous support has also not been balanced, with 31%, 16% and 52% of its climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). In 2019 and 2020, 16% of France's bilateral adaptation finance was provided as grants, while 83% was provided as loans (with 12% of those loans being non-concessional) (ibid.). The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies the submission states: *"In each country, the AFD local office elaborates a strategy which is presented to the national partners and shared with the Ministry of Finance in the country to ensure its consistency with the needs and priorities of the country."* Concerning vulnerability, detailed information on the degree to which France's future climate finance will target the most vulnerable is lacking. However, the submission does state that adaptation finance will prioritise LDCs and the most vulnerable, particularly in the agricultural sector. The need for grant-based support to the most vulnerable is not referenced in the submission. Information in the biennial communication refers to financial provisions to the GCF as an institution with a strong focus on adaptation in LDCs and SIDS. The LDC and SIDS shares of France's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 16% and 4.1%, below and well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). While stating that gender is one of multiple priorities within the Solidarity and Development Law, and that gender equality targets within broader ODA exist, the information provided in the submission concerning the gender-responsiveness of French climate support lacks detail.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	The definition of new and additional climate finance provided in France's submission states: "France defines new and additional climate finance as newly committed or disbursed climate finance during each year." This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, France provided 4% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). France provided 0.51% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Information provided in the submission focuses on the French Development Agency's private-sector subsidiary, The submission focuses on the past record of France's engagements with the private sector and fails to explicitly outline a detailed plan to mobilise further private climate finances in the future. Concerning financial flows being consistent with low-emissions development, the communication cites France's 30 million EUR grant to the AFD 2050 Facility, which supports the design and implementation of long-term low emission and climate-resilient development strategies in around thirty developing countries.

Switzerland

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Switzerland's second biennial communication restates its target to provide 400 million CHF of public climate finance annually from 2021-2024, while stating this target was already surpassed in 2020. The submission does not provide indicative annual projections beyond 2024, and lacks detail regarding the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be supported in the future. As a result, the submission does not significantly enhance the predictability of future climate finance for developing country Parties. On balance between adaptation and mitigation, Switzerland commits to providing balanced bilateral public climate finance for adaptation and mitigation on a grant-equivalent basis. Switzerland's submission does not include a strong commitment to provide balanced overall support through all channels. On vulnerability, Switzerland's second biennial communication provides limited qualitative and quantitative information regarding the future support to be provided to LDCs and SIDS. The predictability of future Swiss support is further limited by the lack of information provided on additionality. Switzerland defines all its climate finance as "new and additional" because its annual climate finance totals have increased from 2013-2020. This definition of additionality does not adhere to the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC and does not protect against increases in Switzerland's climate finance displacing ODA.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	While reiterating a commitment to provide 400 million CHF annually up to 2024, Switzerland's second biennial communication does not provide additional enhanced information outlining future provisions of climate finance to be provided in 2023, 2024, or later, and information regarding the finance to be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes is lacking. As with Switzerland's first biennial communication, without more detailed annual figures for the coming years, the submission only adds detail regarding a number of the multilateral organisations it will fund: *"Switzerland has committed 150 Mio. USD for GCF-1 and 155,4 Mio CHF for GEF-8 (35% increase compared to the Swiss contribution to GEF-7), and overall CHF 39.5 Mio. to the Adaptation Fund until 2024. In line with the call for doubling adaptation finance, Switzerland will double its contribution to the LDCF/SCCF from a total of 13 Mio. CHF for the period of 2019-2022 to a total of 26 Mio. CHF for the period 2023-2026."* Regarding recipient countries and policy priorities and sectors, information in the submission refers to Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024, which focuses primarily on overall development support. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, Switzerland will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning balance, the submission states: *"In 2019 and in 2020 Switzerland has provided slightly more public climate finance on a grant equivalent basis for bilateral adaptation activities in developing countries than for bilateral mitigation activities. Switzerland will continue to aim for a balance in its support to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation activities on a grant equivalent basis for 2023 and 2024."* Grant-equivalent figures help to better estimate the value of non-grant finance once the conditions of the finance are accounted for, such as that provided through loans which must be repaid, often with interest. It is important to note that grant-equivalent figures tend to increase adaptation shares, as adaptation finance is more commonly provided in the form of grants. At face value, the adaptation, mitigation, and cross-cutting shares of the climate finance reported in Switzerland's Fifth Biennial Report were 27%, 36%, and 38%, respectively. While the submission does confirm support to the Glasgow Climate Pact and refer to a commitment to the Adaptation Fund, Switzerland's second biennial communication does not present a target to provide balanced climate finance in the context of its overall support. Regarding grant-based support, the majority of Swiss adaptation support is provided through grants with the submission stating that this practice will continue.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning vulnerability, the submission states: *"The Swiss support to developing countries for climate action is deployed in a demand driven manner, where the majority of partner countries prioritizes adaptation over mitigation"*. Further detail and clarity to outline how finance is to be developing country-led is not provided. No information is provided to specifically address how, and to what degree, finance will be extended to LDCs and SIDS. Aside from references to support to be provided to the LDCF, neither LDCs, SIDS or vulnerability are referenced in the submission in the context of future financial support. The LDC and SIDS shares of Switzerland's climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2019-2020 were approximately 14% and 1%, respectively, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states: *"The promotion of gender equality is also part of one of the four strategic overarching objectives of the Swiss international cooperation strategy 2021-2024. Gender responsiveness will continue to be mainstreamed into the Swiss climate action support."*
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	On additionality, the biennial communication states that the Party will continue to consider its climate finance to be new and additional due to the amounts of climate finance provided by Switzerland increasing from 2013-2020. This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. Between 2011-2018, Switzerland provided all its climate finance on top of the level of level of development finance the country provided in 2009, prior to the Copenhagen Accord, yet none was provided in excess of the UN's 0.7% target (CARE, 2022). Switzerland provided 0.5% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Switzerland's submission states that: *"Switzerland remains committed to increasing its share of mobilised private finance as part of its climate finance spending,"* and that it *"aims to continue to increase its share of mobilised private climate finance in 2023 and 2024."* In addition, the second biennial communication states: *"In order to boost the mobilisation of the private sector for climate-friendly investments in developing countries, SECO [State Secretariat for Economic Affairs] is willing to promote partnerships, including multilateral partnerships, aimed at mobilising private resources."* However, the information provided does not lay out a substantive plan on how further mobilisations will be achieved, and little additional information has been provided in addition to that which was offered in Switzerland's first biennial communication. Concerning finances compatible with Article 2.1.c. of the Paris Agreement, the submission outlines Switzerland's effort with various delivery channels to promote Paris Alignment, stating, for example: *"SECO is also supporting several projects and programs, which support developing countries to align their financial sector with a low-emission and climate resilient development pathway."*

Italy

4

Italy has provided some enhanced quantitative information within its second biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. However, the submission does not provide aggregate figures to outline annual future climate finance totals, instead referring to existing multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions and to some bilateral finance projections and how these finance flows are expected to change through to 2025. The biennial communication states that Italy aims to strike a “fair balance” between mitigation and adaptation support, and that this balance will be sought in the future. The submission refers to the Glasgow Climate Pact and the need to collectively double adaptation finance by 2025 yet does not provide a quantitative target for Italy’s future adaptation finance. Italy provides no substantive information on how the needs of the most vulnerable will be met, including through funding to LDCs, SIDS and gender-responsive activities. The biennial communication does not enhance clarity for developing countries regarding climate finance additionality. Italy does not provide a meaningful definition of “new and additional” climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, with the submission stating that such a definition would be detrimental for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Italy's second biennial communication provides little enhanced information outlining its future provisions of climate finance, including on how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes. The information provided on projected climate finance is partial and somewhat unclear. The submission does not reference the financial target presented by Italy at the G20 meet in 2021 and reiterated at COP27 to provide 1.4 billion USD annually for five years (Reuters, 2021; Italian Government, 2022). Only ex-post annual totals for climate finance have been included in the biennial communication. Despite this, the submission provides some information outlining how bilateral support and contributions through some multilateral institutions and other channels could increase between 2021-2025. However, a clear and holistic picture of projected annual levels of public financial resources for climate change action in developing countries has not been provided, and there is no reference to how, or whether, Italy will contribute its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD target. Concerning specific recipients, the submission states the intention to continue to support priority countries who are presented, yet there is no indicative detail concerning how much future climate finance will be extended to individual recipient countries.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	The submission cites the Glasgow Climate Pact and the need to, at least, collectively double adaptation finance by 2025, while stating that Italy *"aims to strike a fair balance in allocating support to mitigation and adaptation actions"*. The submission adds that *"in the future, Italy will strive to maintain this balanced allocation"*. The submission therefore states an intent to provide balanced support, while noting that fixed targets could undermine the needs and priorities of developing countries, and that increases in adaptation finance shouldn't be at the expense of mitigation finance. Most of the climate finance reported by Italy to the UNFCCC is cross-cutting in nature, and further detail on the actual extent to which mitigation and adaptation are targeted is lacking. Reporting in Italy's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that 16%, 72% and 12% of climate finance was provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The majority of cross-cutting and adaptation support provided by Italy is in the form of grants.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Regarding developing country-driven strategies, the submission states that bilateral cooperation *"is based on a peer exchange with partner countries and it is managed through Joint Committees, in which donors, recipients and main actors participate."* Adding that cooperation activities are inspired by the principles of the Busan Partnership, including: *"ownership, focus on results, partnerships, transparency and shared responsibility"*. Concerning vulnerability, no detail is explicitly provided on how future climate finances will prioritise the most vulnerable and no reference is made to either LDCs or SIDS. Of Italy's 20 priority countries, 10 are LDCs while Cuba is identified as a SIDS. The LDC and SIDS shares of Italy's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 13% and 1.5%, respectively, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). No information is provided to show how Italy's climate support ensures gender-responsiveness.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Italy's submission defines new and additional climate finance as: *"resources that are newly committed and/or disbursed through the different channels and from the different sources that constitutes the diverse landscape of climate finance on an annual basis."* Adding: *"Italy considers highly detrimental as well as meaningless for the effective implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement any attempt to discern development and climate finance"*. While climate change should be considered in all development activities, reporting the same finance as contributing towards both development and climate finance targets does not meaningfully ensure additionality or adhere to the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Italy provided 91% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Italy provided 0.29% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning a plan to mobilise private climate finance, the information provided in Italy's second biennial communication states Italy's National Financial Institution for International Development Cooperation *"can play a role as a private investor, potentially catalyzing capital from public and private donor entities."* Adding that "Italy is committed to more effectively track and monitor private climate finance mobilized through public interventions" yet that *"At the moment, it is challenging to provide estimates on potential leverage and private finance mobilized through the Italian Climate Fund, as private finance involvement is foreseen at project level, which will be approved by the ad-hoc committees."* The information provided falls short of a clear and detailed plan for future engagements with the private sector, and no indicative quantitative data is presented. Concerning low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: *"Italy is supporting the alignment of financial and policy support to developing countries with the objectives of the Paris Agreement in different fora, from MDBs to investment funds and the relevant OECD working groups for methodological and policy advancements."* While referencing both development support and domestic policies and measures relevant to Article 2.1.c, the submission lacks detail on how Italian development cooperation will ensure finance flows are consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilient development.

Austria

3

Austria's second biennial communication provides very little enhanced information to better ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. As was the case in the country's first biennial communication, Austria has not provided enhanced quantitative information to outline its future support. Instead, the submission focuses on reporting previous efforts to provide climate finance. While ex-post information can be useful when set against future projections (to track how a scaled-up pledge compares to previous efforts), no such forward looking multi-year budgets have been outlined in the submission. Due to the lack of a policy to ensure balanced climate finance, Austria have failed to further clarify how they will meet their aim to balance support for adaptation and mitigation objectives. Furthermore, the imbalance between adaptation and mitigation objectives has worsened in Austria's recent reporting. The submission states that Austria will continue to prioritise LDCs, however, as a proportion of its total climate support, Austria has not reported significant amounts of climate finance to LDCs across 2019-2020. The submission does include additional information on the gender responsiveness of its support, but the proportion of climate finance reported with gender equality objectives remains low. Austria has not enhanced clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of "new and additional" climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. The submission does provide some information regarding the alignment of financial flows with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, though the primary focus remains on previous efforts to do so domestically, rather than forward looking international examples.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Austria's second biennial communication submission does not outline any aggregate quantitative climate finance commitments for future years and provides little qualitative information to enhance the predictability of its support. The submission acknowledges that there is *"currently no government commitment to an overall specific figure for future climate finance"*, and that *"The (un)predictability of funding is certainly a relevant barrier for both sides."* The information provided is therefore based on assumptions drawn from previous efforts: *"From 2021 to 2023, the budget line for climate action will be increased compared to 2020; part of this increase will be dedicated to international climate finance."* The submission continues to refer to previous commitments, such as the MFA target to ensure 55% of its ODA provision is environmentally relevant. Austria provides some information on multiyear commitments to selected multilateral institutions such as the GCF, and to the climate finance portfolio of the Ministry for Climate Action. The submission also refers to a focus on *"LDCs such as Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership region as well as fragile states"* as development partners. Overall, the submission provides little enhanced information beyond that which was provided in its first biennial communication and does not evidence a substantive effort to enhance the predictability of Austria's future climate finance for developing countries. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, Austria will ensure they provide their fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Austria's submission notes that *"there is no overall policy in place to implement the balance between adaptation and mitigation finance"*, but that *"it is foreseen to be included in update of Austrian Strategy on International Climate Finance"*. The biennial communication notes that *"Austria is aiming for balance between mitigation and adaptation finance"*. The submission therefore does not include a strong commitment to balance Austria's support for the two objectives. Qualitatively, the report outlines that future increases in bilateral funding will be focussed on adaptation, implying a greater proportion of grant funding for adaptation. In comparison, the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB) will focus more on mitigation. Reporting in Austria's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that 5%, 50% and 45% of climate finance was provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Figures indicate that Austria remains far from providing balanced support, despite referencing its long-term goal to address the issue of balance within both its first and second biennial communication submissions.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Austria's second biennial communication states that *"Austrian climate finance puts a strong emphasis on most vulnerable groups and countries as well as on gender responsiveness and equality. This is shown in the focus on Least Developed Countries and SIDS and in the strategies underlying the provision of climate finance"*. The LDC and SIDS shares of Austria's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 4% and 0.1%, respectively, both far below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Factors in project selection include *"Consistence with the relevant national planning documents, including NDCs, NAPs, long term strategies as well as national legislation in the field of climate are important factors; A participatory approach towards local communities, creating ownership; Promotion of gender equality; Inclusion of local knowledge while transferring tech"*, among others. The information on gender integration into climate finance has improved slightly compared to the previous biennial communication, with data confirming the level of bilateral support which was gender relevant at *"Around 32%"*. While this added detail is welcome, the figures are low when considering the urgent need for gender responsive climate finance. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, Austria cooperates with partner countries based on the internationally agreed principles of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Concerning additionality, the submission defines new and additional finance as: "*A gradual scaling up of support over time, with new programmes, projects and focus areas supplementing and/or extending existing initiatives over time, with the overall volume of support provided increasing in the longer term.*" This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Austria provided 53% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Austria provided 0.31% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Austria's submission states, *"Austria is committed to mobilise private climate finance and to extend tracking to cover mobilised private climate finance over time. The most important Austrian actor in mobilizing additional climate finance is the Development Bank of Austria OeEB, as it works together with private sector entities."* The submission does not outline a clear plan to mobilise private climate finance, nor indicative quantitative totals of such support. Instead of outlining future efforts and plans, the submission relies on citing current initiatives. For example, *"Austria is mainstreaming the goals and objectives of the Paris Agreement into its policies, including the development policy. Austria is a member of the Coalition of Finance Ministers, a special initiative co-chaired by Finland and Indonesia."* Three explicit initiatives are discussed – the Financial Market Authority, PACTA2020, and the Green Finance Agenda – which indicate that the government aims at aligning investments. Additionally, the submission states that Austria is supportive of the OECD DAC's declaration *"to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change"*. Furthermore, Austria provides a great deal of detail on the alignment of domestic flows with article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement.

Spain

2

Beyond the establishment of its target to contribute 1,350 million EUR of climate finance per year by 2025, inclusive of public and private flows, Spain has provided little substantive and enhanced qualitative and quantitative information in its second biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future support for developing countries. There is no indication of multi-annual budgeting, and no indication of key recipient countries, programmes, and projects to be funded. The submission refers to the ongoing development of a new International Climate Finance Strategy and it is acknowledged that, once published, this document may significantly enhance the predictability of Spain's future climate finance. The submission states that Spain will place "special attention" on scaling up adaptation finance, however no specific pledge is made to address the currently low levels of adaptation support being provided. In addition, little information is provided to highlight how, and to what degree, support will target the most vulnerable, including LDCs and SIDS. Spain's submission states that its climate finance can be considered to be "new and additional" as it is newly committed or disbursed climate finance during each year. This definition does not meaningfully ensure additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, and does not ensure that increases in climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Information provided in Spain's second biennial communication repeats the commitment made by Spain at COP26, that climate finance will be increased by 50%, reaching 1,350 million EUR per year from 2025, including finance from public and private sources. The submission does not provide information on how, or whether, Spain will ensure it provides its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal. The submission notes the development of a forthcoming Climate Finance Strategy, which will *"enhance information on the projected levels of climate finance"*. However, as the Strategy is not yet published, this assessment cannot take its contents into account. The submission provides some examples outlining the projected levels of finance to be provided through a selection of specific multilateral institutions as multiannual commitments. The submission further states that support will continue to be provided through some specific bilateral programmes, though provides no indication of countries to be funded, other than regional priorities. As a result, a holistic picture of Spain's future provisions of climate finance has not been outlined in detail in the submission. For example, quantitative, indicative annual targets have not been outlined, and there is no indication of how the target amount will be achieved in the years leading up to 2025.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Spain's biennial communication acknowledges that, historically, Spanish climate finance has not been balanced: *"Finance for mitigation has so far played a greater role [...] however special attention is given now to scale up finance for adaptation following the new commitment of doubling adaptation finance by 2025 from 2019 levels."* While Spain have cited the Glasgow Climate Pact's aim to collectively double adaptation finance, no quantitative information is provided regarding how the delivery of scaled-up adaptation finance will be achieved by Spain in the future. The submission includes a weak statement regarding balance, outlining that Spain *"is exploring several options to enhance the balance between adaptation and mitigation"*. Reporting in Spain's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that support remains imbalanced, with 5%, 36% and 59% of climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). As a result, a doubling of the adaptation finance provided in 2019 by 2025, alongside increases in overall climate finance, would not ensure balance within Spain's climate finance provisions. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, information in Spain's biennial communication is lacking and refers only to the common chapter of the EU submission. Little detail is provided on how, or whether, Spain's future support will target the most vulnerable. The submission references the Spanish Cooperation Master Plan as setting regional priorities with countries who are particularly vulnerable to climate change, yet detail is lacking. The LDC and SIDS shares of Spain's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 5% and 7%, below and above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). On gender-responsiveness the submission states: *"Gender and environmental issues, including climate change, are two mainstreaming priorities"* There is no reference to gendered impacts of climate change and no further detail provided in the context of Spain's planned support.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Information in the submission states: *"Spain defines new and additional climate finance as newly committed or disbursed climate finance during each year."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Spain provided 9% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Spain provided 0.26% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Spain's biennial communication states that the mobilisation of private-sector finance is considered through bilateral and multilateral climate finance channels. However, the submission only refers to current actions, and contains little detail outlining a clear plan to mobilise further resources in the future. However, multiple channels and institutions mobilising private climate finance have been referenced elsewhere in the biennial communication. Concerning financial provisions in line with low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: *"Spain works to enhance the mobilization of climate finance and promotion of actions to shifts investments, in line with article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, both domestically and in recipient countries. This includes innovative finance, cofinancing schemes, green and social bonds etc., as well as encouraging the private and financial sector to step up their climate finance commitments and mainstream climate change in their portfolios."* A key example given is the case of FONPRODE, a fund which has set up several cofinancing framework agreements with IFIs. With regards to Paris Alignment, there is a focus on achieving alignment at the domestic level, with the submission noting that, *"All these actions and experiences are often shared with interested third parties"*.

Japan

2

Japan has provided some quantitative information within its second biennial communication to enhance the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides a five-year commitment to provide approximately 71 billion USD of climate finance between 2021-2025. Despite this, the submission provides very limited detail regarding the countries, programmes and projects to be funded through the support. Japan's submission re-commits to doubling adaptation finance by 2025, yet this commitment will not ensure balanced support. The biennial communication includes no formal commitment towards ensuring balanced support for adaptation and mitigation objectives moving forwards. Due to the lack of enhanced information regarding recipient countries to be financed through future support, the extent to which LDCs and SIDS will be considered in Japan's future climate finance is unclear. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding the gender-responsiveness of future support or regarding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Japan's biennial communication provides some quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance to be provided to developing countries. The submission outlines that Japan will provide up to approximately 71 billion USD of public and private climate finance from 2021-2025 (14.2 billion USD annually). The commitment represents a 15% increase above the amounts of public and private finance reported by Japan in 2020, of 12.4 billion USD. The submission does not include information to indicate how, or whether, Japan considers its fair share of the collective goal will be met. Beyond highlighting a selection of multi-year commitments to various multilateral organisations, the submission provides little information regarding how that finance will be apportioned between recipients, programmes, and projects. The information therefore lacks clarity and only partially enhances the predictability of the country's climate finance for developing countries.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Regarding balance, the submission states that Japan achieved balance between mitigation and adaptation through its 2020 support, while referencing an announcement made during COP26: *"that it would double the assistance for adaptation, totalling approx. 1.6 trillion yen in public and private funds over the five years from 2021 to 2025."* This target of approximately 14.6 billion USD of adaptation finance (or 2.9 billion USD annually) will not ensure that balance will be achieved in future climate support. Japan's submission does not include explicit statements recognising the historic imbalance in international climate finance or ensuring that balanced support will be provided in the future. Reporting in Japan's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that support remains far from balanced, with 28%, 11% and 61% of climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based resources for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Japan failed to provide substantive clarity and detail regarding the recipients, programmes, and projects to be funded through its support, instead focusing on a multi-year target and provisions to multilateral organisations. The submission outlines that finance provided to the GCF, UNDP and IMF will target vulnerability. There is very limited information within the submission outlining how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable, in particular LDCs and SIDS. The submission does not acknowledge the need for grant-based support for LDCs, SIDS and the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of Japan's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 35% and 1.1%, above and below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states that Japan ensures a *"request based approach."* Adding: *"Japan sets out a Country Assistance Policy for a respective recipient country, which lays out country-specific priorities and solutions for development cooperation, in close consultation with each country."* On the gender-responsiveness of its support, the submission states: *"Japan integrates gender perspectives when providing support in climate change projects"*, then providing an example of doing so in the forestry sector. No substantive information is provided to indicate how gender-responsive support will be ensured in the future.
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	The submission states: *"Japan defines 'new and additional' climate finance as 'newly committed or disbursed finance which contributes to climate change measures in developing countries during a given period of time.' For this purpose, Japan gains new funding with the approval of the Diet on an annual basis. The Government of Japan adopts an annual budgetary cycle system in which any new funding request, notwithstanding climate-related or not, needs to be approved by the National Diet year by year."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Japan provided 12% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Japan provided 0.34% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Japan recognises the importance of mobilising private climate finance within its submission and included mobilised private finance in its 2021-2025 financial commitment. In general, the information provided in the submission focuses on efforts to mobilise private resources through different instruments, such as JICA, JBIC and NEXI. While the submission provides some examples of its future efforts to engage the private sector, the submission does not provide a holistic plan regarding future mobilisation efforts and the role they will play in delivering Japan's commitments.

Portugal

2

Portugal has provided little substantive quantitative or qualitative information within its second biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission reiterates the country's commitment to double its climate finance to 35 million EUR, by 2030, while primarily referring to past commitments, projects, and programmes as indicative of its future support. The submission states that Portugal is in the final steps of approving a new National Strategy for Development Cooperation, which could enhance predictability in the future. Portugal includes no formal commitment indicating that it will provide balanced adaptation and mitigation finance moving forward but has a past record of providing near parity between the two objectives. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding the gender-responsiveness of future support, nor support to the most vulnerable, including LDCs and SIDS. Concerning additionality, Portugal states that it considers its dedicated Environment Fund to be a source of "non-conventional" ODA, and so can be considered as "new and additional" support.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Very little quantitative or qualitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate action in developing countries have been provided. The submission reiterates the country's commitment to double its climate finance to 35 million EUR, by 2030. Information in the submission primarily concerns past provisions of Portuguese climate finance, and its recipients and programmes. The submission does not include information to indicate how, or whether, Portugal considers its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal will be met. It should be noted that the submission outlines that Portugal is in the process of creating a new National strategy for Development Cooperation, which could further enhance the clarity of future support.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Information in the submission indicates that balanced provisions of climate finance have been sought in past support, and that adaptation was often favoured due to Portugal responding to developing countries' needs. The submission does not recognise the present imbalance in climate finance and contains no explicit commitment to provide balanced provisions in the future. Reporting in Portugal's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that support prioritises adaptation, with 71%, 8% and 21% of climate finance provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Despite the high proportion of adaptation support which has been provided by Portugal in the past, the biennial communication lacks substantive detail regarding the characteristics of its future efforts. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based support for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Portugal has not provided information in response to all of the requests outlined in the Annex to the COP decision regarding Article 9.5. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states: *"Portugal establishes Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) discussed and agreed with recipient countries. It is the recipient country that puts forward its own proposals for programs, projects or actions, on the basis of their needs and presents it to the Portuguese Cooperation or the Environmental Fund for financing. Programs, projects or actions are developed in close cooperation with national institutions and local communities in the recipient countries."* Information on support to LDCs and SIDS, and on vulnerability in general, has not been provided. Nor has any information on the gender-responsiveness of Portugal's support. The LDC and SIDS shares of Portugal's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 13% and 36%, below and well above the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Information provided in the submission states: *"In 2016 Portugal established the Environmental Fund (FA) with the aim to finance actions focused on environment and climate change mainly at domestic level. However, the FA has a dedicated window to support financing ODA projects. Given the non-conventional nature of this source of ODA flows, Portugal considers this financial mechanism as a new and additional source of funding."* While Portugal's definition creates a distinction between the climate finance provided through the FA and the finances provided through other channels, both are reported as ODA. This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Portugal provided 23% of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, while none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Portugal provided 0.18% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Portugal's biennial communication does not include information regarding the mobilisation of further resources, nor the consistency of flows with low emissions and climate resilience development.

Czech Republic

1

While information to outline future development finance provisions have been included in the Czech Republic's second biennial communication, little detail has provided to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no clear commitment indicating that balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance will be provided in the future. The Czech Republic supports LDCs through support to half of its partner countries, indicating these will likely continue to be supported in future. The Czech Republic has not provided any information regarding how it defines or provides "new and additional" climate finance. Some specific initiatives to engage the private sector are highlighted, but no reference to how this support will change in the future is made.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Information in the Czech Republic's biennial communication includes projected levels of development finance, without specifying climate finance levels. *"2022 figures will be CZK 960 million, with roughly equal contributions envisaged for 2024/25. This includes bilateral funds to six priority countries, instruments for partnering with the private sector."* The six priority countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Georgia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Zambia. The Czech Republic has signed framework documents with these countries for the years 2018-23. Therefore, the figures outlined above indicate estimates beyond these agreements. No information is provide to indicate the proportion of this support which is planned to be climate relevant. In addition, information has not been provided regarding support to be provided through multilateral partners other than noting contributions to GCF & GEF. No information has been provided to outline specific bilateral projects and programmes to be used to extend climate finance. Priority sectors and cross-cutting issues such as gender equality are also outlined, but detail is lacking.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	The submission states that *"the Czech Republic channels support for both adaptation and mitigation. However, it does not have a specific policy that would aim to ensure them in a balanced manner."* Instead, the submission reverts to noting that *"adaptation support has prevailed over mitigation and cross-cutting finance"*, with the implication support would continue in this vein. Reporting in the Czech Republic's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that 38%, 43% and 19% of climate finance was provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). Despite evidence highlighting that the Czech Republic provides more adaptation finance than mitigation finance, explicit information and commitments regarding the balance of future support is lacking in the submission. The submission does not acknowledge the need for grant-based support.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	The Czech Republic's biennial communication submission includes little explicit reference to vulnerability, LDCs, or SIDS. Of their six priority countries mentioned above three are LDCs, and support for them is confirmed up to 2023. However, no information has been provided showing how, and how much, future climate support will be distributed between development partners. The LDC and SIDS shares of the Czech Republic's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 33% and 0.1%, above and below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period, respectively (OECD, 2023). Regarding the inclusion of country driven priorities, the Czech submission writes, *"The sectoral focus was designed in consultation with each priority country in the respective programme document (usually 1-3 sectors, e.g. agriculture, water and sanitation, etc.). On top of the sectoral priorities, climate change and environmental protection, together with gender equality and good governance, are recognized in our Development Cooperation Strategy as cross-cutting principles."*
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	The submission provides no definition of new and additional climate finance. There is very sparse information included on the mainstreaming of climate change into development support.
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Detail is lacking on the mobilisation of private climate finance, and no clear plan is presented to engage the private sector. The submission primarily outlines previous initiatives to engage private actors: *"partnerships with the private sector, including the mobilization of additional private resources for sustainable development, namely the so-called B2B programme of the Czech Development Agency, the SDG partnership programme with UNDP, and the Financial Instruments programme (previously "Development Guarantee") of the National Development Bank of the Czech Republic (previously "Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank")."*

Slovenia

1

Although Slovenia has included some information to outline its future efforts to provide development finance, its second biennial communication does not provide substantive, enhanced quantitative information to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions. Slovenia's biennial communication includes a weak commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance, and the country has prioritised adaptation objectives in the past. The submission contains little information regarding how its support will address vulnerability and the needs of LDCs and SIDS, or how its support will be gender-responsive. In addition, Slovenia has not outlined a detailed definition regarding "new and additional" climate finance.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Information in Slovenia's second biennial communication includes projected levels of bilateral and multilateral development finance, and a commitment to provide 0.33% of its GNI as ODA by 2030. The submission does not include enhanced information outlining projected levels of climate finance, stating only that "We expect a gradual growth of ODA figures, incl. for climate-related issues". Information has not been provided regarding any projects and programmes to be funded while extending climate finance in the future. Recipients of Slovenia's future climate support are also not explicitly referred to, while the Western Balkans and European Neighbourhood are referred to as targets for development support.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Information in the biennial communication lacks detail regarding balanced support. The submission states that Slovenia targets climate and environmental objectives as cross-cutting issues within its development support, and that: *"Slovenia is pursuing to allocate public climate finance between climate change mitigation and adaptation in a balanced way"*, yet further detail is lacking. The submission does not reference the current imbalance in international climate finance, or an intent to address it, nor the need for grant-based support for adaptation. Slovenia's reporting to the EU outlines that 29%, 68% and 6% of climate finance was provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation objectives, respectively (Government of Slovenia, 2020; European Union, 2021).
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission references government principles guiding humanitarian and development interventions, stating: *"Slovenia`s goal is to maintain the country`s ownership of its sustainable development. Therefore, when directing financial flows, it intensively cooperates with implementing partner`s stakeholders throughout the project planning process"*. On how support will address the needs of the most vulnerable, information in the communication is lacking, other than references to geographic areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The submission does not reference LDCs or SIDS, or how its support is gender-responsive. The LDC share of Slovenia's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 was 3%, below the share provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Slovenia provided no climate finance to SIDS over the same period (ibid.).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Information provided in Slovenia's submission outlines that: *"Slovenia is continuously increasing its efforts trying to mobilize new and additional resources specific for climate change activities through bilateral and multilateral contributions in additional to the existing public climate support. Slovenia is also seeking additional channels to strengthen dialogue with the private sector, especially for bilateral development projects to mobilize additional and new funding capacities."* The submission does not provide an explicit definition of additionality, nor information evidencing that its future support will be new and additional in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. In 2021, Slovenia provided 0.19% of its GNI as ODA.
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Limited information is provided in the biennial communication concerning the mobilisation of private climate finance. The submission states that Slovenia *"is aiming to increase cooperation with the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, the public agency of the Republic of Slovenia for the promotion of entrepreneurship, internationalization, foreign investments and technology."* The submission then outlines that additional finance is leveraged through Slovenian support to NGOs using co-financing schemes, yet no detailed plans to mobilise private resources in the future have been outlined. In addition, there is little information regarding how financial flows are, or will be, consistent with low-emissions and climate resilient development.

Greece

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Greece's second biennial communication includes little information to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission does not provide substantive and enhanced information to outline its future support, with many components of the submission missing. The submission provides no enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate finance. In addition, Greece provides only a weak statement regarding balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance and has reported only cross-cutting finance in the past, making it difficult to assess the objectives being targeted. Concerning the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be financed, sufficient detail to enhance predictability is lacking. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of "new and additional" climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Greece's second biennial communication does not provide enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes. The information in the submission includes a tentative qualitative statement concerning future provisions of climate finance: *"As the economy recovers it is expected that Greece's ODA and subsequently the climate finance provided to developing countries will resume a positive trajectory."* Concerning recipients, the biennial communication states: *"Greece seeks to resolve challenges facing the Mediterranean, Southeast Europe and the Middle East, and advocates for a safe marine environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two trilateral cooperation schemes, one with Cyprus and Egypt and another one with Cyprus and Israel are in progress which give an emphasis to climate change adaptation, among other objectives."* There is no detail provided concerning the geographic targets of future support. The submission does not include information to indicate how, or whether, Greece considers its fair share of the collective 100 billion USD goal will be met.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Concerning balance, the submission states: *"Greece is in favour of a good balance between adaptation and mitigation finance according to developing countries' priorities,"* and yet no assurances of balance in future support is provided. Reporting in the Greece's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that 1% and 99% of its climate finance was provided towards adaptation and cross-cutting objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). As the majority of Greece's past support is provided as cross-cutting finance, the precise adaptation and mitigation shares are difficult to determine. The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based support for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states: *"The issues selected respond to the existing and emerging needs identified by the competent authorities of the two non-Annex I countries i.e. Egypt and Israel."* Greece's biennial communication provides no information concerning future development partners, vulnerability, or gender-responsiveness. The submission does note the requirement to evaluate proposals with regards to whether they are aligned to recipient country priorities and to ensure that the *"proposed project should also be in line with country's NDC"*. The LDC share of the Greece's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 was 11%, below the share provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023). Greece provided no climate to SIDS over the same period (ibid.).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Information provided in the submission outlines that: *"Financial support is determined as 'new and additional' if they are new sources or amounts since the last reporting period."* This definition does not ensure that the country's climate finance will be new and additional to its support for development, and is not in line with the content and spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC. From 2011-2018, Greece provided none of its climate finance above the level of development finance it provided in 2009, and none was provided in excess of the UN target to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA (CARE, 2022). Greece provided 0.16% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 (OECD, 2023a).
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Limited information is provided by Greece concerning mobilised private finance, and regarding financial flows consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience.

Slovakia

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Due to a lack of quantitative or qualitative data concerning future climate finances, Slovakia's second biennial communication does not provide substantive, enhanced information to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to a multiyear commitment to the GCF. Slovakia have provided detail to outline the partner countries it plans to support through broader development finance. Slovakia's biennial communication does not provide a clear commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance, or any references to vulnerability, LDCs, SIDS or the gender-responsiveness of its support. In addition, Slovakia has no policy regarding the additionality of its climate finance.

Criteria	Information provided
Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? A. 0 B. 1	Slovakia notes in its submission that as part of the Paris Agreement it remains committed to jointly mobilizing 100 billion USD of climate finance by the year 2025, to address the needs of developing countries. While Slovakia does not have a specific target with regards to the quantity of its future climate finance provisions, the submission does provide some detail with regards to programming, partner countries, and regional efforts. The submission further outlines previous and ongoing contributions to the GCF (for the years covering 2021-2023). However, the submission does not meaningfully enhance detail regarding Slovakia's future provision of future climate finance. Information has not been provided regarding any other projects and programmes to be used to extend the finance. Recipients of Slovakia's future climate support are also not explicitly referred to, with reference only made to broader development partners.
Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? A. 0 B. 1	Information in the submission states: *"Slovakia has limited possibilities to achieve balance between mitigation and adaptation support within development interventions. In the meantime there is no policy or methodology for strictly promoting such balance."* No information has been provided to outline whether balanced support will be provided in the future. Reporting in the Slovakia's Fifth Biennial Report outlines that 30%, 25%, and 45% of its climate finance was provided towards adaptation, cross-cutting, and mitigation objectives, respectively (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission does not recognise the need for grant-based support for adaptation.
The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? A. 1 B. 1	Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the communication states that Slovakia's development support takes developing country priorities as a point of departure: *"priorities are based on the needs of partner countries, the global challenges of the international community, priorities of SK foreign policy as well as on previous Slovak experiences."* No information has been provided concerning how future climate support will target the most vulnerable or respond to their needs, or regarding the gender-responsiveness of the support. The LDC and SIDS shares of Slovakia's climate-related development finance in 2019-2020 were 8% and 0.3%, respectively, both below the shares provided collectively by all developed countries over the same period (OECD, 2023).
Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? A. 1 B. 2	Information provided in Slovakia's submission outlines that: *"Although the concept of the new and additional resources - as stated in Art 4.3 of UNFCCC - has been discussed within Slovak administration, in the meantime there are no rules for attributing this concept to the existing or planned respective climate finance sources."*
Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? A. 1 B. 1	Limited information is provided in the biennial communication concerning the mobilisation of private climate finance. However, the submission does note *"The interest is in seeking synergies between the development goals of SK ODA and the business goals of Slovak companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, in developing countries"*. There is little information regarding how financial flows are, or will be, consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience.

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ANNEX A

Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement

Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.

Decision 12/CMA.1

Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,

Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

Also recalling Article 9, paragraphs 1–5, of the Paris Agreement,

Further recalling Articles 3, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 14 of the Paris Agreement,

Recalling decisions 3/CP.19, 1/CP.21, 13/CP.22 and 12/CP.23,

Underscoring the need for continued and enhanced international support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement,

1 Recognizes the importance of predictability and clarity of information on financial support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

2 Reiterates that developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties, and that other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis;

3 Underlines the importance of Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement on this matter;

4 Requests developed country Parties to submit the biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above and as specified in the annex starting in 2020;

5 Encourages other Parties providing resources to communicate biennially, as referred to in paragraph 2 above, on a voluntary basis;

6 Requests the secretariat to establish a dedicated online portal for posting and recording the biennial communications;

7 Also requests the secretariat to prepare a compilation and synthesis of the information included in the biennial communications, referred to in paragraph 2 above, starting in 2021, and to inform the global stocktake;

8 Further requests the secretariat to organize biennial in-session workshops beginning the year after the submission of the first biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above, and to prepare a summary report on each workshop;

9 Decides to consider the compilations and syntheses referred to in paragraph 7 above and the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 8 above starting at its fourth session (November 2021);

10 Also decides to convene a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance beginning in 2021, to be informed, inter alia, by the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 8 above and the biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above;

11 Requests the President of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to summarize the deliberations of the dialogue referred to in paragraph 10 above for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its succeeding session;

12 Invites the Conference of the Parties to consider the compilations and syntheses and the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, respectively;

13 Decides to consider updating the types of information contained in the annex at its sixth session (2023) on the basis of Parties' experience and lessons learned in the preparation of their biennial communications of indicative quantitative and qualitative information;

14 Takes note of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraphs 6–8 and 10 above;

15 Requests that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex to decision 12/CMA.1

Types of information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.

Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis. This should include:

(a) Enhanced information to increase clarity on the projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing countries, as available;

(b) Indicative quantitative and qualitative information on programmes, including projected levels, channels and instruments, as available;

(c) Information on policies and priorities, including regions and geography, recipient countries, beneficiaries, targeted groups, sectors and gender responsiveness;

(d) Information on purposes and types of support: mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting activities, technology transfer and capacity-building;

(e) Information on the factors that providers of climate finance look for in evaluating proposals, in order to help to inform developing countries;

(f) An indication of new and additional resources to be provided, and how it determines such resources as being new and additional;

(g) Information on national circumstances and limitations relevant to the provision of ex ante information;

(h) Information on relevant methodologies and assumptions used to project levels of climate finance;

(i) Information on challenges and barriers encountered in the past, lessons learned and measures taken to overcome them;

(j) Information on how Parties are aiming to ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account the country-driven strategies and the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation;

(k) Information on action and plans to mobilise additional climate finance as part of the global effort to mobilise climate finance from a wide variety of sources, including on the relationship between the public interventions to be used and the private finance mobilised;

(l) Information on how financial support effectively addresses the needs and priorities of developing country Parties and supports country-driven strategies;

(m) Information on how support provided and mobilised is targeted at helping developing countries in their efforts to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including by assisting them in efforts to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development;

(n) Information on efforts to integrate climate change considerations, including resilience, into their development support;

(o) Information on how support to be provided to developing country Parties enhances their capacities.

ANNEX B

Estimating a financial target's progression beyond previous efforts

Party	Reference: Baseline annual climate finance (USD)	Climate finance target	Projection: Estimated future annual climate finance under the target (USD)	Estimated increase in annual climate finance implied by target:
Australia	242,272,412 a	2 billion AUD over five years from 2021-2025.	300,525,920	24%
Austria	333,579,014 a	No target provided.	-	-
Belgium	117,661,148 a	At least 135 million EUR per year from 2022 onwards.	159,763,314	36%
Canada	422,647,528 b	5.3 billion CAD over five years from 2021-2025.	845,295,056	100%
Czech Republic	10,878,924 a	No target provided.	-	-
Denmark	272,619,271 a	Scale up grant-based climate finance to at least 25% of development assistance from 2023 (expected to correspond to more than 4 billion DKK annually).	636,233,498	133%
European Union (excl. EIB)	2,891,145,115 a	27.8 billion EUR in support of climate objectives over seven years from 2021-2027.	4,699,915,469	63%
Finland	157,472,697 a	Around or above 200 million EUR annually from 2024-2026.	236,686,391	50%
France	6,245,705,262 a	6 billion EUR in public climate finance annuallyw from 2021-2025.	7,100,591,716	14%
Germany	4,495,000,000 a, g	6 billion EUR from budgetary sources annually by 2025.	7,100,591,716 g	58%
Greece	1,022,126 a	No target provided.	-	-
Iceland	18,148,449 a	No submission.	-	-
Ireland	104,396,993 a	225 million EUR annually by 2025.	301,775,148	189%
Italy	566,894,707 a	No target provided.	-	-
Japan	12,400,000,000 c	Up to approximately 71 billion USD of public and private climate finance over five years from 2021-2025.	14,200,000,000	15%
Luxembourg	31,677,431 a	220 million EUR of International Climate Finance over five years from 2021 to 2025.	52,071,006	64%
Netherlands	1,250,000,000 d	Increase public and private climate finance from 1.25 billion EUR in 2021 to EUR 1.80 billion EUR in 2025.	1,800,000,000	44%
New Zealand	71,055,000 a	1.3 billion NZD over four years from 2022 to 2025.	229,844,413	223%
Norway	720,070,406 a	14 billion NOK per year by 2026 compared to NOK 7 billion in 2020.	1,629,802,095	126%
Portugal	8,996,181 a	35 million EUR per year by 2030.	41,420,118	360%
Slovakia	4,395,397 a	No target provided.	-	-
Slovenia	4,526,632 a	No target provided.	-	-
Spain	1,065,088,757 e	1,350 million EUR per year from 2025.	1,597,633,136	50%
Sweden	803,633,288 a	15 billion SEK per year by 2025.	1,748,863,239	118%
Switzerland	415,000,000 c	400 million CHF (approx. 426 million USD) public climate finance per year by 2024.	426,000,000	3%
United Kingdom	1,607,495,000 a	11.6 billion GBP over five years from 2021-2025.	3,191,196,699	99%
United States	2,800,000,000 f	11.4 billion USD per year by 2024.	11,400,000,000	300%

Table A1: *The financial targets presented in countries' second biennial communications, and the increase in annual climate finance provisions they imply, as compared to previous levels. Periodical targets, i.e., a target to provide a financial amount across multiple years, are assumed to be distributed equally over the period. Exchange rates used are those produced by the OECD for 2021.*

a. *Average annual amount of climate finance provided in 2019 and 2020, as reported by the provider in Fifth Biennial Reports.*

b. *Annual average amount of climate finance provided between 2016-2020 as referenced in the provider's second biennial communication (2.65 billion CAD between 2016-2020). Canada's financial target includes only public sources of finance, and finance Rio marked with "principal" objectives, and is therefore not suitably compared against reporting in Canada's Fifth Biennial Report.*

c. *Annual amount of climate finance provided in 2020 as referenced in the provider's second biennial communication in relation to the stated financial target. Financial target includes both public and private climate finance and is therefore not suitably compared against reporting in the contributor's Fifth Biennial Report.*

d. *Annual amount of climate finance provided in 2021 as referenced in the provider's second biennial communication in relation to the stated financial target. Financial target includes both public and private climate finance and is therefore not suitably compared against reporting in the Netherland's Fifth Biennial Report.*

e. *Annual amount of climate finance implied in the provider's second biennial communication in relation to the stated financial target. Spain's financial target includes finance provided through more channels than are presented in its Fifth Biennial Report and is not therefore suitably compared against it. Here a reference baseline amount of annual climate finance has been assumed to be 50% below the stated target of 1,350 million EUR, due to a lack of information allowing further calculations.*

f. *Annual average amount of climate finance provided between FY2013-2016 as implied by the provider's second biennial communication in relation to the stated financial target (2.85 billion USD). Annual average climate finance provided by the United States decreased significantly from 2017-2020, resulting in the country referencing 2013-2016 figures in its target. This comparison has been maintained here.*

g. *Stated reference and projection figures include only German climate finance from budgetary sources, in line with the stated financial target.*

ANNEX C

Adaptation finance targets

Party	Estimated future annual climate finance under proposed targets (see Annex B)	Adaptation finance target	Estimated future annual adaptation finance under the target (USD)
Australia	300,525,920	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Australia acknowledges the need to improve the balance between mitigation and adaptation and recognises the importance of adaptation financing, including for our region."	104,391,530[a]
Austria	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Belgium	159,763,314	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Belgium strongly supports a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provision of financial support at the international level, and has a specific focus on the importance to allocate sufficient funding to the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable countries."	80,456,708[a]
Canada	845,295,056	Canada's $5.3 billion commitment (over five years from 2021-2025) is bolstering support for adaptation action by increasing the provision of funding towards adaptation to a minimum of 40% to help developing countries build resilience to climate change impacts.	338,118,022
Czech Republic	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Denmark	636,233,498	From 2023 onwards grant-based climate finance will constitute at least 25 % of our direct assistance to developing countries (expected to constitute around DKK 4 billion annually), at least 60 % of this climate finance will be earmarked for adaptation.	381,740,099
European Union (excl. EIB)	4,699,915,469	Expected around half of total climate finance (27.8 billion EUR in support of climate objectives over seven years from 2021-2027) will continue to serve climate adaptation objectives.	2,349,957,735
Finland	236,686,391	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "It is estimated that from 2022 onwards grant-based climate finance flows will be equally split between adaptation and mitigation."	11,303.598[a]
France	7,100,591,716	One third of total annual climate finance (6 billion EUR in public climate finance annually from 2021-2025) dedicated to adaptation.	2,366,863,905
Germany	7,100,591,716[c]	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Germany is particularly committed to increase its focus on adaptation activities to contribute its share to the collective goal of doubling adaptation finance by 2025 from 2019 levels, while advocating a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources... The German government has kept its climate finance from budgetary sources (including grant equivalents in KfW development loans) close to parity throughout the past years and will continue to do its best in order to maintain this balance."	2,840,236,686[a,c]
Greece	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Iceland	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Ireland	301,775,148	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Ireland's bilateral and regional funding is focused on adaptation in an effort toward re-balancing an overall global emphasis on mitigation finance."	116,988,515[a]

Party	Estimated future annual climate finance under proposed targets (see Annex B)	Adaptation finance target	Estimated future annual adaptation finance under the target (USD)
Italy	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "In the future, Italy will strive to maintain [a balanced allocation], even though Italy values country ownership in the allocation of funds to better respond to the needs and priorities of developing countries"	-
Japan	14,200,000,000	Japan also announced at COP26 that it would double the assistance for adaptation, totalling approx. 1.6 trillion yen in public and private funds over the five years from 2021 to 2025	2,915,611,276
Luxembourg	52,071,006	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Luxembourg's ICF Strategy no longer applies strict and siloed quotas for mitigation, adaptation and REDD+ support."	10,344,446[a]
Netherlands	1,800,000,000	Increase in climate finance (private and public) from EUR 1.25 billion in 2021 to EUR 1.80 billion in 2025. The public climate finance is almost completely in the form of grants and more than half of it will be spent on climate change adaptation with a focus on the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world.b	532,544,379
New Zealand	229,844,413	New Zealand committed in 2021 to delivering at least NZ$1.3 billion in climate-related support from 2022 to 2025. At least 50 percent of this funding is to be provided to Pacific Island countries, and at least 50 percent of the total support adaptation focused.	114,922,207
Norway	1,629,802,095	Norway has made a commitment to double our total annual climate finance to NOK (Norwegian Krone) 14 billion by 2026 compared to NOK 7 billion in 2020, and as part of this to at least triple our adaptation finance.	199,532,205
Portugal	41,420,118	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	29,238,051[a]
Slovakia	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Slovenia	-	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	-
Spain	1,597,633,136	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Aim for scaling up finance for adaptation."	72,879,645[a]
Sweden	1,748,863,239	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance.	496,079,127[a]
Switzerland	426,000,000	No quantitative target for total adaptation finance. Provided context on adaptation support: "Switzerland will continue to aim for a balance in its support to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation activities on a grant equivalent basis for 2023 and 2024... including by continuing to provide at least 50% of its public bilateral grant-based public climate finance for adaptation."	113,746,295[a]
United Kingdom	3,191,196,699	We will continue to strike a balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation, and will triple our provision of climate finance for adaptation from 2019, to £1.5 billion in 2025	2,063,273,728
United States	11,400,000,000	President Biden announced at the 2021 United Nations General Assembly his intention to work with Congress to quadruple U.S. international public climate finance to over $11 billion per year by 2024, including a six-fold increase in adaptation finance to over $3 billion per year	3,000,000,000

Table A2: *Adaptation finance targets, and statements regarding balance, as presented in countries' second biennial communications and the annual future amounts of adaptation finance they imply. Where countries have not outlined a quantitative target for future adaptation finance, an estimate has been produced by multiplying a country's estimated future annual climate finance total (as presented in Annex B) by the share of that country's climate finance which targeted adaptation in 2019 and 2020, as per Fifth Biennial Reports. No estimate has been made for those countries who provided neither quantitative climate finance targets nor adaptation finance targets in their second biennial communication submissions. Periodical targets, i.e., a target to provide a financial amount across multiple years, are assumed to be distributed equally over the period. Exchange rates used are those produced by the OECD for 2021.*

a No quantitative adaptation finance target has been outlined. An estimate has been produced by multiplying a country's estimated future annual climate finance total (as presented in Annex B) by the share of that country's climate finance which targeted adaptation in 2019 and 2020, as per Fifth Biennial Reports.

b Of the Netherland's target to provide EUR 1.8 billion of climate finance from public and private sources by 2025, EUR 900 million will come from private sources. Therefore, 50% of the remaining EUR 900 million from public sources is stated to target adaptation.

c Figures include only German climate finance from budgetary sources, in line with the stated climate finance target.

IMAGE CREDITS

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care.org

CARE Denmark
Jemtelandsgade 1
2300 København S
care@care.dk

CARE's Climate Change and Resilience Platform
Parkstraat 19
2514 JD Den Haag
P.O. BOX 85720
2508 CK Den Haag
info@careclimatechange.org

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